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Abstract
An interesting challenge for the cryptography community is to design authentication pro-
tocols that are so simple that a human can execute them without relying on a fully trusted
computer. We propose several candidate authentication protocols for a setting in which the
human user can only receive assistance from a semi-trusted computer—a computer that stores
information and performs computations correctly but does not provide confidentiality. Our
schemes use a semi-trusted computer to store and display public challenges Ci ∈ [n]k. The
human user memorizes a random secret mapping σ : [n]→ Zd and authenticates by computing
responses f(σ(Ci)) to a sequence of public challenges where f : Zkd → Zd is a function that
is easy for the human to evaluate. We prove that any statistical adversary needs to sample
m = Ω˜
(
ns(f)
)
challenge-response pairs to recover σ, for a security parameter s(f) that depends
on two key properties of f . Our lower bound generalizes recent results of Feldman et al. [26]
who proved analogous results for the special case d = 2. To obtain our results, we apply the
general hypercontractivity theorem [45] to lower bound the statistical dimension of the distribu-
tion over challenge-response pairs induced by f and σ. Our statistical dimension lower bounds
apply to arbitrary functions f : Zkd → Zd (not just to functions that are easy for a human to
evaluate). As an application, we propose a family of human computable password functions
fk1,k2 in which the user needs to perform 2k1 + 2k2 + 1 primitive operations (e.g., adding two
digits or remembering a secret value σ(i)), and we show that s(f) = min{k1+1, (k2+1)/2}. For
these schemes, we prove that forging passwords is equivalent to recovering the secret mapping.
Thus, our human computable password schemes can maintain strong security guarantees even
after an adversary has observed the user login to many different accounts.
1 Introduction
A typical computer user has many different online accounts which require some form of authenti-
cation. While passwords are still the dominant form of authentication, users struggle to remember
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1
ar
X
iv
:1
40
4.
00
24
v4
  [
cs
.C
R]
  9
 Se
p 2
01
6
their passwords. As a result users often adopt insecure password practices (e.g., reuse, weak pass-
words) [28, 21, 39, 18] or end up having to frequently reset their passwords. Recent large-scale
password breaches highlight the importance of this problem [1, 21, 11, 3, 50, 8, 2, 5, 4, 7, 6, 9].
An important research goal is to develop usable and secure password management scheme — a
systematic strategy to help users create and remember multiple passwords. Blocki et al. [13] and
Blum and Vempala [17] recently proposed password management schemes that maintain some se-
curity guarantees after a small constant number of breaches (e.g., an adversary who sees three of
the user’s passwords still has some uncertainty about the user’s remaining passwords).
In this work we focus on the goal of developing human computable password management
schemes in which security guarantees are strongly maintained after many breaches (e.g., an ad-
versary who sees one-hundred of the user’s passwords still has high uncertainty about the user’s
remaining passwords). In a human computable password management scheme the user reconstructs
each of his passwords by computing the response to a public challenge.
Our human computable password schemes admittedly require more human effort than the
password management schemes of Blocki et al. [13] and Blum and Vempala [17], and, unlike
Blocki et al. [13], our scheme requires users to do simple mental arithmetic (e.g., add two single-
digit numbers) in their head. However, our proposed schemes are still human usable in the sense
that a motivated, security-conscious user would be able to learn to use the scheme and memorize
all associated secrets in a few hours. In particular, the human computation in our schemes only
involves a few very simple operations (e.g., addition modulo 10) over secret values (digits) that
the user has memorized. More specifically, in our candidate human computable password schemes
the user learns to compute a simple function f : Zkd → Zd,1 and memorizes a secret mapping
σ : [n]→ Zd. The user authenticates by responding to a sequence of single digit challenges, i.e., a
challenge-response pair (C, f (σ (C))) is a challenge C ∈ Xk ⊆ [n]k and the corresponding response.
One of our candidate human computable password schemes involves the function
f (x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, . . . , x13) = x13 + x12 + x(x10+x11 mod 10) mod 10 .
If the user memorizes a secret mapping σ from n images to digits then each challenge C =
(I0, . . . , I13) would correspond to an ordered subset of 14 of these images and the response to
the challenge is f
(
σ(I0), . . . , σ(I13)
)
. We observe that a human would only need to perform three
addition operations modulo 10 to evaluate this function. The user would respond by (1) adding the
secret digits associated with challenge images I10 and I11 to get a secret index 0 ≤ i ≤ 9, (2) finding
image Ii, (3) adding the secret digits associated with images Ii, I12 and I13 to produce the final
response. To amplify security the user may respond to λ ≥ 1 single-digit challenges C1, . . . , Cλ to
obtain a λ digit password f(σ(C1)), . . . , f(σ(Cλ)). We note that the challenge C does not need to
be kept secret and thus the images can be arranged on the screen in helpful manner for the human
user — see Figure 1 for an example and see Appendix A for more discussion of the user interface.
We present a natural conjecture which implies that a polynomial time attacker will need to see
the responses to Ω˜
(
ns(f)
)
random challenges before he can forge the user’s passwords (accurately
predict the responses to randomly selected challenges)2. Here, s(f) is a security parameter that
1 In our security analysis we consider arbitrary bases d. However, our specific schemes use the base d = 10 that
is most familiar to human users.
2We stress that, unlike [13, 17], our security guarantees are not information theoretic. In fact, a computationally
unbounded adversary would need to see at most O (n) challenge-response pairs to break the human computable
password management scheme.
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Figure 1: Computing the response f(σ(C)) = 6 to a single digit challenge C.
depends on two key properties of the function f (in our above example s(f) = 3/2). Furthermore,
we provide strong evidence for our conjecture by ruling out a broad class of algorithmic techniques
that the adversary might use to attack our scheme.
Following Blocki et al. [13] we consider a setting where a user has two types of memory:
persistent memory (e.g., a sticky note or a text file on his computer) and associative memory
(e.g., his own human memory). We assume that persistent memory is reliable and convenient but
not private (i.e., an adversary can view all challenges stored in persistent memory, but he cannot
tamper with them). In contrast, a user’s associative memory is private but lossy—if the user does
not rehearse a memory it may be forgotten. Thus, the user can store a password challenge C ∈ Xk
in persistent memory, but the mapping σ must be stored in associative memory (e.g., memorized
and rehearsed). We allow the user to receive assistance from a semi-trusted computer. A semi-
trusted computer will perform computations accurately (e.g., it can be trusted to show the user
the correct challenge), but it will not ensure privacy of its inputs or outputs. This means that a
human computable password management scheme should be based on a function f that the user
can compute entirely in his head.
Contributions. We provide precise notions of security and usability for a human computable
password management scheme (Section 2). We introduce the notion of UF-RCA security (Un-
forgeability under Random Challenge Attacks). Informally, a human computable password scheme
is UF-RCA secure if an adversary cannot forge passwords after seeing many example challenge-
response pairs.
We present the design of a candidate family of human computable password management
schemes fk1,k2 , and analyze the usability and security of these schemes (Section 3). Our usability
analysis indicates that to compute fk1,k2 (σ (C)) the user needs to execute 2k1 + 2k2 + 1 simple
operations (e.g., addition of single digits modulo 10). The main technical result of this section
(Theorem 1) states that our scheme is UF-RCA secure given a plausible conjecture about the hard-
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ness of random planted constraint satisfiability problems (RP-CSP). Our conjecture is that any
polynomial time adversary needs to see at least m = nmin{r(f)/2,g(f)+1−} challenge-response pairs
(C, f (σ (C))) to recover the secret mapping σ. Here, s(f) = min{r(f)/2, g(f) + 1} is a composite
security parameter involving g(f) (how many inputs to f need to be fixed to make f linear?) and
r(f) (what is the largest value of r such that the distribution over challenge-response pairs are
(r − 1)-wise independent?). We prove that g (fk1,k2) = k1 and r (fk1,k2) = (k2 + 1) /2.
Next we prove that any statistical adversary needs at least Ω˜
(
nr(f)/2
)
challenge-response pairs
(C, f (σ (C))) to find a secret mapping σ′ that is -correlated with σ (Section 4). This result may
be interpreted as strong evidence in favor of the RP-CSP hardness assumption as most natural
algorithmic techniques have statistical analogues (see discussion in Section 4). While Gaussian
Elimination is a notable exception, our composite security parameter accounts for attacks based
on Gaussian Elimination—an adversary needs to see m = Ω˜
(
n1+g(f)
)
challenge-response pairs
to recover σ using Gaussian Elimination. Moving beyond asymptotic analysis we also provide
empirical evidence that our human computable password management scheme is hard to crack.
In particular, we used a CSP solver to try to recover σ ∈ Zn10 given m challenge-response pairs
using the functions f1,3 and f2,2. Our CSP solver failed to find the secret mapping σ ∈ Z5010
given m = 1000 random challenge-response pairs with both functions f1,3 and f2,2. Additionally,
we constructed public challenges for cryptographers to break our human computable password
management schemes under various parameters (e.g., n = 100, m = 1000).
Our lower bound for statistical adversaries is based on the statistical dimension of the distribu-
tion over challenge-response pairs induced by f and σ. We stress that our analysis of the statistical
dimension applies to arbitrary functions f : Zkd → Zd, not just to functions that are easy for humans
to compute. Our analysis of the statistical dimension generalizes recent results of Feldman et al.
[26] for binary predicates and may be of independent interest. While the analysis is similar at a
high level, we stress that our proofs do require some new ideas. Because our function f is not a
binary predicate we cannot use the Walsh basis functions to express the Fourier decomposition of f
and analyze the statistical dimension of our distribution over challenge-response pairs as Feldman
et al. [26] do. Instead, we use a generalized set of Fourier basis functions to take the Fourier de-
composition of f , and we apply the general hypercontractivity theorem [45] to obtain our bounds
on the statistical dimension.
We complete the proof of Theorem 1 in Section 5 by proving that forging passwords and ap-
proximately recovering the secret mapping are equivalent problems for a broad class of human
computable password schemes, including our candidate family fk1,k2 . This result implies that any
adversary who can predict the response f(C) to a random challenge C with better accuracy than
random guessing can be used as a blackbox to approximately recover the secret mapping.
2 Definitions
2.1 Notation
Given two strings α1, α2 ∈ Znd we use H (α1, α2)
.
= |{i ∈ [n] α1[i] 6= α2[i]}| to denote the Hamming
distance between them. We will also use H (α1)
.
= H
(
α1,~0
)
to denote the Hamming weight of
α1. We use σ : [n] → Zd to denote a secret random mapping that the user will memorize. We
will sometimes abuse notation and think of σ ∈ Znd as a string which encodes the mapping, and
we will use σ ∼ Znd to denote a random mapping chosen from Znd uniformly at random. Given a
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distribution D we will use x ∼ D to denote a random sample from this distribution. We also use
x ∼ S to denote an element chosen uniformly at random from a finite set S.
Definition 1. We say that two mappings σ1, σ2 ∈ Znd are -correlated if H(σ1,σ2)n ≤ d−1d − , and
we say that a mapping σ ∈ Znd is δ-balanced if maxi∈{0,...,d−1}
∣∣∣∣H(σ,~i)n − d−1d ∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ.
Note that for a random mapping σ2 we expect σ1 and σ2 to differ at Eσ2∼Znd [H (σ1, σ2)] =
n
(
d−1
d
)
locations, and for a random mapping σ and i ∼ {0, . . . , d− 1} we expect σ to differ from ~i
at Ei∼Zd,σ∼Znd
[
H
(
σ,~i
)]
= n
(
d−1
d
)
locations. Thus, with probability 1 − o(1) a random mapping
σ2 will not be -correlated with σ1, but a random mapping σ will be δ-balanced with probability
1− o(1).
We let Xk ⊆ [n]k denote the space of ordered clauses of k variables without repetition. We
use C ∼ Xk to denote a clause C chosen uniformly at random from Xk and we use σ (C) ∈ Zkd to
denote the values of the corresponding variables in C. For example, if d = 10, C = (3, 10, 59) and
σ (i) = (i+ 1 mod 10) then σ (C) = (4, 1, 0).
We view each clause C ∈ Xk as a single-digit challenge. The user responds to a challenge
C by computing f (σ (C)), where f : Zkd → Zd is a human computable function (see discussion
below) and σ : [n] → Zd is the secret mapping that the user has memorized. For example,
if d = 10, C = (3, 10, 59), σ (i) = (i+ 1 mod 10) and f (x, y, z) = (x− y + z mod 10) then
f (σ (C)) = (4− 1 + 0 mod 10) = 3. A length-λ password challenge ~C = 〈C1, . . . , Cλ〉 ∈ (Xk)λ is
a sequence of t single digit challenges, and f (σ (~c)) = 〈f (σ (C1)) , . . . , f (σ (Cλ))〉 ∈ Zλd denotes the
corresponding response (e.g., a password).
Let’s suppose that the user has m accounts A1, . . . , Am. In a human computable password
management scheme we will generate m length-λ password challenges ~C1, . . . , ~Cm ∈ (Xk)λ. These
challenges will be stored in persistent memory so they are always accessible to the user as well
as the adversary. When our user needs to authenticate to account Ai he will be shown the
length-t password challenge ~Ci =
〈
Ci1, . . . , C
i
λ
〉
. The user will respond by computing his pass-
word pi =
〈
f
(
σ
(
Ci1
))
, . . . , f
(
σ
(
Ciλ
))〉 ∈ Zλd .
2.2 Requirements for a Human Computable Function
In our setting we require that the composite function f ◦ σ : Xk → Zd is human computable.
Informally, we say that a function f is human-computable if a human user can evaluate f quickly
in his head.
Requirement 1. A function f is tˆ-human computable for a human user H if H can reliably
evaluate f in his head in tˆ seconds.
We argue that a function f will be human-computable whenever there is a fast streaming al-
gorithm [10] to compute f using only very simple primitive operations. A streaming algorithm is
an algorithm for processing a data stream in which the input (e.g., the challenge C) is presented
as a sequence of items that can only be examined once. In our context the streaming algorithm
must have a very low memory footprint because a typical person can only keep 7 ± 2 ‘chunks’ of
information in working memory [41] at any given time. Our streaming algorithm can only involve
primitive operations that a person could execute quickly in his head (e.g., adding two digits modulo
10, recalling a value σ(i) from memory).
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Definition 2. Let P be a set of primitive operations. We say that a function f is (P, t˜, mˆ)-
computable if there is a space mˆ streaming algorithm A to compute f using only t˜ operations from
P .
In this paper we consider the following primitive operations P : Add, Recall and TableLookup.
Add : Z10×Z10 → Z10 takes two digits x1 and x2 and returns x1 +x2 mod 10. Recall : [n]→ Z10
takes an index i and returns the secret value σ(i) that the user has memorized. TableLookup :
Z10 × [n]10 → [n] takes a digit x1 and finds the x1’th value from a table of 10 indices. We take
the view that no human computable function should require users to store intermediate values in
long-term memory because the memorization process would necessarily slow down computation.
Therefore, we restrict our attention to space mˆ streaming algorithms and do not include any prim-
itive operation like MemorizeValue.
Example: The function f ◦ σ(i1, . . . , i5) = σ (i1) + . . . + σ (i5) requires 9 primitive operations
(five Recall operations and four Add operations) and requires space mˆ = 3 (e.g., we need one slot
to store the current total, one slot to store the next value from the data stream and one free slot
to execute a primitive operation).
Similar primitive operations have been studied by cognitive physchologists (e.g., [51]). The time
γH it takes a human user H to execute one primitive operation will typically improve with practice
(e.g., [33]). We note that we allow this computation speed constant γH to vary from user to user in
the same way that two computers might operate at slightly different speeds. We conjecture that,
after training, a human user H with a moderate mathematical background will be able to evaluate
a (P, t˜, 3)-computable function in tˆ ≤ t˜ seconds — the first author of this paper found that (after
some practice) he could evaluate (P, 9, 3)-computable functions in 7.5-seconds (γH ≤ 1).
Conjecture 1. Let P = {Add,Recall,TableLookup}. For each human user H there is a small
constant γH > 0 such that any (P, t˜, 3)-computable function f will be tˆ-human computable for H
with tˆ = γH t˜.
2.3 Password Unforgeability
In the password forgeability game the adversary attempts to guess the user’s password for a ran-
domly selected account after he has seen the user’s passwords at m/λ other randomly selected
accounts. We say that a scheme is UF-RCA (Unforgeability against Random Challenge Attacks)
secure if any probabilistic polynomial time adversary fails to guess the user’s password with high
probability. In the password forgeability game we select the secret mapping σ : [n] → Zd uni-
formly at random along with challenges C1, . . . , Cm+λ ∼ Xk. The adversary is given the func-
tion f : Zkd → Zd and is shown the challenges C1, . . . , Cm+λ as well as the values f (σ (Ci)) for
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. The game ends when the adversary A outputs a guess 〈q1, . . . , qλ〉 ∈ Zλd for the
value of 〈f (σ (Cm+1)) , . . . , f (σ (Cm+λ))〉. We say that the adversary wins if he correctly guesses
the responses to all of the challenges Cm+1, . . . , Cm+λ, and we use Wins (A, n,m, λ) to denote the
event that the adversary wins the game (e.g., ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , λ}.qi = f (σ (Cm+i)) ). We are interested
in understanding how many example single digit challenge-response pairs the adversary needs to
see before he can start breaking the user’s passwords.
Definition 3. (Security) We say that a function f : Zkd → Zd is UF−RCA (n,m, λ, δ)−secure if
for every probabilistic polynomial time (in n,m) adversary A we have Pr [Wins (A, n,m, λ)] ≤ δ,
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where the randomness is taken over the selection of the secret mapping σ ∼ Znd , the challenges
C1, . . . , Cm+λ as well as the adversary’s coins.
Discussion Our security model is different from the security model of Blocki et al. [13] in which
the adversary gets to adaptively select which accounts to compromise and which account to attack.
While our security model may seem weaker at first glance because the adversary does not get to
select which account to compromise/attack, we observe that the password management schemes of
Blocki et al. [13] are only secure against one to three adaptive breaches. By contrast, our goal is
to design human computable password schemes that satisfy UF −RCA security for large values
of m (e.g. 1000), which means that it is reasonable to believe that the user has at most m/λ
password protected accounts. If the user has at most m/λ accounts then union bounds imply that
an adaptive adversary — who gets to compromise all but one account — will not be able to forge
the password at any remaining account with probability greater than mδ/λ (typically, m λ/δ)3.
2.4 Security Parameters of f
Given a function f : Zkd → Zd we define the function Qf : Zk+1d → {±1} s.t. Qf (x, i) = 1 if f(x) = i;
otherwise Qf (x, i) = −1. We use Qfσ to define a distribution over Xk×Zd (challenge-response pairs)
as follows: Pr
Qfσ
[C, i]
.
= Q
f (σ(C),i)+1
2|Xk| . Intuitively, Q
f
σ is the uniform distribution over challenge
response pairs (C, j) s.t. f (σ (C)) = j. We also use Qf,j : Zkd → {±1} (Qf,j (x) = Qf (x, j)) to
define a distribution over Xk. PrQf,jσ
[C] = Q
f,j(f(σ(C)))+1
2|{C′∈Xk:f(σ(C′))=j| = PrQfσ [(C, i) i = j]. We write the
Fourier decomposition of a function Q : Zkd → {±1} as follows
Q(x) =
∑
α∈Zkd
Qˆα · χα (x) ,where the basis functions are χα (x) .= exp
(−2pi√−1 (x · α)
d
)
.
We say that a function Q has degree ` if ` = max
{
H (α) α ∈ Zkd ∧ Qˆα 6= 0
}
— equivalently if
Q(x) =
∑
iQi(x) can be expressed as a sum of functions where each function Qi : Zkd → R depends
on at most ` variables.
Definition 4. We use r(Q)
.
= min
{
H (α) ∃α ∈ Zkd.Qˆα 6= 0 ∧ α 6= ~0
}
to denote the distributional
complexity of Q, and we use r(f) = min
{
r
(
Qf,j
)
j ∈ Zd
}
to denote the distributional complexity
of f . We use
g(f)
.
= min
{
` ∈ N ∪ {0} ∃α ∈ Z`d, S ⊆ [k], dˆ ∈ Zd.s.t |S| = ` and f|S,α is a linear function mod dˆ
}
,
to denote the minimum number of variables that must be fixed to make f a linear function. Here,
f|S,α : Zk−`d → Zd denotes the function f after fixing the variables at the indices specified by S to
α. Finally, we use s(f)
.
= min{r(f)/2, g(f) + 1} as our composite security measure.
We conjecture that a polynomial time adversary will need to see m = ns(f) challenge-response
pairs before he can approximately recover the secret mapping σ. We call this conjecture about the
hardness of random planted constraint satisfiability problems RP-CSP (Conjecture 2). In support
3We assume in our analysis that the adversary does not get to pick the challenges C that the user will solve.
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of RP-CSP we prove that any statistical algorithm needs to see at least m = Ω˜
(
nr(f)/2
)
challenge
response pairs to (approximately) recover the secret mapping σ and we observe that a polynomial
time adversary would need to see m = O
(
ng(f)+1
)
challenge-response pairs to recover σ using
Gaussian Elimination. In Section 5 we show that the human computable password scheme will be
UF-RCA secure provided that RP-CSP holds and that f satisfies a few moderate properties (e.g.,
the output of f is evenly distributed).
Conjecture 2 (RP-CSP). For every probabilistic polynomial time adversary A and every , ′ > 0
there is an integer N s.t. for all n > N , m ≤ nmin{r(f)/2,g(f)+1−′} we have Pr [Success (A, n,m, )] ≤
µ(n), where Success (A, n,m, ) denotes the event that A finds a mapping σ′ that is -correlated
with σ given m randomly selected challenge response pairs (C1, f (σ (C1))) , . . . , (Cm, f (σ (Cm)))
and µ(n) is a negligible function. The probability is over the selection of the random mapping σ,
the challenges C1, . . . , Cm and the random coins of the adversary.
3 Candidate Secure Human Computable Functions
In this section we present a family of candidate human computable functions. We consider the
usability of these human computable password schemes in Section 3.1, and we analyze the security
of our schemes in Section 3.2.
We first introduce our family of candidate human computable functions (for all of our candidate
human computable functions f : Zkd → Zd we fix d = 10 because most humans are used to
performing arithmetic operations on digits). Given integers k1 > 0 and k2 > 0 we define the
function fk1,k2 : Z
10+k1+k2
10 as follows
fk1,k2 (x0, . . . , x9+k1+k2) = xj +
9+k1+k2∑
i=10+k1
xi mod 10, where j =
(
9+k1∑
i=10
xi
)
mod 10 .
Authentication Process We briefly overview the authentication process — see Algorithms 2
and 3 in Appendix A for a more formal presentation of the authentication process. We assume that
the mapping σ : {1, ..., n} → Z10 is generated by the user’s local computer in secret. The user may
be shown mnemonic helpers (see discussion below) to help memorize σ, but these mnemonic helpers
are discarded immediately afterward. After the user has memorized σ he can create a password pwi
for an account Ai as follows: the user’s local computer generates λ random single-digit challenges
Ci1, . . . , C
i
λ ∈ Xλ and the user computes pwi = f (σ (C1)) , . . . , f (σ (Cλ)). The authentication server
for account Ai stores the cryptographic hash of pwi, while the challenges C
i
1, . . . , C
i
λ ∈ Xλ are stored
in public memory (e.g., on the user’s local computer), which means that they can be viewed by the
adversary as well as the legitimate user. To authenticate the user retrieves the public challenges
Ci1, . . . , C
i
λ for account Ai and computes pwi. The server for Ai verifies that the cryptographic hash
of pwi matches its records. To protect users from offline attacks in the event of a server breach, the
password pwi should be stored using a slow cryptographic hash function H like BCRYPT [47].
3.1 Usability
In our discussion of usability we focus on the time it would take a human user to compute a
password once he has memorized the secret mapping σ. Other important considerations include
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the challenge of memorizing and rehearsing the secret mapping σ to ensure that the user remembers
the secret mapping σ over time.
3.1.1 Computation Time
Given a challenge C = (c0, . . . , c9+k1+k2) ∈ X10+k1+k2 we can compute fk1,k2 (σ (C)) we compute
j =
∑9+k1
i=10 σ (ci) mod 10 using k1−1 Add operations and k1 Recall operations. We then execute
TableLookup (j, c0, . . . , c9) to obtain cj . Now we need k2 Add operations and k2 + 1 Recall
operations to compute the final response σ (cj) + σ (c10+k1) + . . .+ σ (c9+k1+k2).
Fact 1. Let P = {Add,Recall,TableLookup} then fk1,k2 ◦σ is (P, 2k1 + 2k2 + 1, 3)-computable.
Fact 1 and Conjecture 1 would imply that f1,3 and f2,2 are tˆ-human computable with tˆ = 9
seconds for humans H with computation constant γH ≤ 1. The functions f1,3 and f2,2 were both
tˆ-human computable with tˆ = 7.5 seconds for the main author of this paper. While the value of γH
might be larger for many human users who are less comfortable with mental arithmentic, we note we
may have γH  1 for many human users after training (e.g., see https://youtu.be/_-2L6ZxFacg
for a particularly impressive demonstration of mental arithmetic by young children.).
3.1.2 Memorizing and Rehearsing σ
Memorizing the secret mapping might be the most difficult part of our schemes. In practice, we
envision that the user memorizes a mapping from n objects (e.g., images) to digits. For example,
if n = 26 and d = 10 then the user might memorize a random mapping from characters to digits.
The first author of this paper was able to memorize a mapping from n = 100 images to digits in
about 2 hours. We conjecture that the process could be further expedited using mnemonic helpers
— see discussion in the appendix.
After the user memorizes σ he may need to rehearse parts of the mapping periodically to ensure
that he does not forget it. One of the benefits of our human computable password schemes is that
the user will get lots of practice rehearsing the secret mapping each time he computes a password.
In fact users who authenticate frequently enough will not need to spend any extra time rehearsing
the secret mapping as they will get sufficient natural practice to remember σ.
3.2 Security Analysis
Claim 1 demonstrates that s (fk1,k2) = min {(k2 + 1)/2, k1 + 1}. Intuitively, the security of our
human computable password management scheme will increase with k1 and k2. However, the work
that the user needs to do to respond to each single-digit challenge is proportional to 2k1 + 2k2 + 1
(See Fact 1).
Claim 1. Let 0 ≤ k1 and k2 > 0 be given and let f = fk1,k2 we have g(f) = min{k1, 10},
r(f) = k2 + 1 and s(f) = min
{
k2+1
2 , k1 + 1, 11
}
.
An intuitive way to see that r (fk1,k2) > k2 is to observe that we cannot bias the output of fk1,k2
by fixing k2 variables. Fix the value of any k2 variables and draw the values for the other k1 + 10
variables uniformly at random from Z10. One of the k2 + 1 variables in the sum xj +
∑9+k1+k2
i=10+k1
xi
mod 10 will not be fixed. Thus, the probability that the final output of fk1,k2 (x0, . . . , x9+k1+k2) will
be r is exactly 1/10 for each digit r ∈ Z10. Similarly, an intuitive way to see that r (fk1,k2) ≤ k2 + 1
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is to observe that we can bias the value of fk1,k2 (x0, . . . , x9+k1+k2) by fixing the value of k2 + 1
variables. In particular if we fix the variables x0, x10+k1 , . . . , x9+k1+k2 so that 0 = x0 +
∑9+k1+k2
i=10+k1
xi
mod 10 then the output of fk1,k2 (x0, . . . , x9+k1+k2) is more likely to be 0 than any other digit. The
full proof of Claim 1 can be found in Appendix F.
Theorem 1 states that our human computable password management scheme is UF-RCA secure
as long as RP-CSP (Conjecture 2) holds. In Section 4 we provide strong evidence in support of
RP-CSP. In particular, no statistical algorithm can approximately recover the secret mapping given
m = O˜
(
nr(f)/2
)
challenge-response pairs. To prove Theorem 1 we need to show that an adversary
that breaks UF-RCA security for fk1,k2 can be used to approximately recover the secret mapping
σ. We prove a more general result in Section 5.
Theorem 1. Let , ′ > 0, λ ≥ 1 be given. Under the RP-CSP conjecture (Conjecture 2) the
human computable password scheme defined by fk1,k2 is UF −RCA (n,m, λ, δ) − secure for any
m ≤ nmin{(k2+1)/2,k1+1−′} − λ and δ > ( 110 + )λ.
Remark 1. In the Appendix we demonstrate that our security bounds are asymptotically tight. In
particular, there is a statistical algorithm to break our human computable password schemes (fk1,k2)
which requires m = O˜
(
n(k2+1)/2
)
to 1-MSTAT to recover σ (See Theorem 7 in Section G). We
also demonstrate that there is a attack based on Gaussian Elimination that uses m = O˜
(
nk1+1
)
challenge-response pairs to recover σ.
3.2.1 Exact Security Bounds
We used the Constraint Satisfaction Problem solver from the Microsoft Solver Foundations library
to attack our human computable password scheme4. In each instance we generated a random
mapping σ : [n] → Z10 and m random challenge response pairs (C, f (σ (C))) using the functions
f2,2 and f1,3. We gave the CSP solver 2.5 days to find σ on a computer with a 2.83 GHz Intel Core2
Quad CPU and 4 GB of RAM. The full results of our experiments are in Appendix C. Briefly, the
solver failed to find the random mapping in the following instances with f = f2,2 and f = f1,3: (1)
n = 30 and m = 100, (2) n = 50 and m = 1, 000 and (3) n = 100 and m = 10, 000.
Remark 2. While the theoretical security parameter for f1,3 (s (f1,3) = 2) is slightly better than
the security parameter for f2,2 (s (f2,2) = 1.5), we conjecture that f2,2 may be more secure for small
values of n (e.g., n ≤ 100) because it is less vulnerable to attacks based on Gaussian Elimination.
In particular, there is a polynomial time attack on f1,3 based on Gaussian Elimination that requires
at most n2 examples to recover σ, while the same attack would require n3 examples with f2,2. Our
CSP solver was not able to crack σ ∈ Z10010 given 10, 000 = 1002 challenge response pairs with f2,2.
Human Computable Password Challenge. We are challenging the security and cryptography
community to break our human computable password scheme for instances that our CSP solver
failed to crack (see Appendix B for more details about the challenge). Briefly, for each challenge we
selected a random secret mapping σ ∈ Zn10, and published (1) m single digit challenge-response pairs
(C1, f (σ (C1))),. . ., (Cm, f (σ (Cm))), where each clause Ci is chosen uniformly at random from Xk,
and (2) 20 length–λ = 10 password challenges ~C1, . . . , ~C20 ∈ (Xk)10. The goal of each challenge is to
correctly guess one of the secret passwords pi = f
(
σ
(
~Ci
))
for some i ∈ [20]. The challenges can be
4Thanks to David Wagner for suggesting the use of SAT solvers.
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found at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~jblocki/HumanComputablePasswordsChallenge/challenge.
htm. There is a $20 prize associated with each individual challenge (total: $360). We remark that
these challenges remain unsolved even after they were presented during the rump sessions at a
cryptography conference and a security conference[12].
4 Statistical Adversaries and Lower Bounds
Our main technical result (Theorem 3) is a lower bound on the number of single digit challenge-
response pairs that a statistical algorithm needs to see to (approximately) recover the secret map-
ping σ. Our results are quite general and may be of independent interest. Given any function
f : Zkd → Zd we prove that any statistical algorithm needs Ω˜
(
nr(f)/2
)
examples before it can find a
secret mapping σ′ ∈ Znd such that σ′ is -correlated with σ. We first introduce statistical algorithms
in Section 4.1 before stating our main lower bound for statistical algorithms in Section 4.2. We
also provide a high level overview of our proof in Section 4.2.
4.1 Statistical Algorithms
A statistical algorithm is an algorithm that solves a distributional search problem Z. In our case
the distributional search problem Z,f is to find a mapping τ that is -correlated with the secret
mapping σ given access to m samples from Qfσ – the distribution over challenge response pairs
induced by σ and f . A statistical algorithm can access the input distribution Qfσ by querying the
1-MSTAT oracle or by querying the VSTAT oracle (Definition 5).
Definition 5. [26] [1-MSTAT(L) oracle and VSTAT oracle] Let D be the input distribution over
the domain X. Given any function h : X → {0, 1, . . . , L−1}, 1-MSTAT(L) takes a random sample
x from D and returns h(x). For an integer parameter T > 0 and any query function h : X → {0, 1},
VSTAT (T ) returns a value v ∈ [p− τ, p+ τ ] where p = Ex∼D [h(x)] and τ = max
{
1
T ,
√
p(1−p)
T
}
.
In our context the domain X = Xk × Zd is the set of all challenge response pairs and the
distribution D = Qfσ is the uniform distribution over challenge-response pairs induced by σ and
f . Feldman et al. [26] used the notion of statistical dimension (Definition 6 ) to lower bound the
number of oracle queries necessary to solve a distributional search problem (Theorem 2). Before we
can present the definition of statistical dimension we need to introduce the discrimination norm.
Intuitively, if the discrimination norm is small then a statistical algorithm will (whp) not be able
to distinguish between honest samples (C, f(σ(C)) and samples from reference distribution T over
Xk × Zd which is completely independent of σ 5. We define our reference distribution as follows:
Pr
T
[(C, i)] =
Prx∼Zkd [f(x) = i]
|Xk| .
Now given a set D′ ⊆ Znd of secret mappings the discrimination norm of D′ is denoted by κ2(D′)
and defined as follows:
κ2(D′) .= max
h,‖h‖=1
{Eσ∼D′ [|∆ (h, σ)|]} ,
5Observe that this implies that a statistical algorithm cannot find the secret σ. In particular, because the distri-
bution T is independent of the secret mapping σ samples from T will not leak any information about σ.
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where h : Xk × Zd → R, ‖h‖ .=
√
E(C,i)∼Xk×Zd [h2 (C, i)] and
∆ (h, σ)
.
= EC∼Xk [h (C, f (σ (C)))]− E(C,i)∼T [h (C, i)] .
Definition 6. [26]6. For κ > 0, η > 0,  > 0, let d′ be the largest integer such that for any mapping
σ ∈ Znd the set Dσ = Znd \ {σ′ ∈ Znd σ′ is -correlated with σ } has size at least (1− η) · |Znd | and
for any subset D′ ⊆ Dσ where |D′| ≥ |Dσ|/d′, we have κ2(D′) ≤ κ. The statistical dimension
with discrimination norm κ and error parameter η is d′ and denoted by SDN(Z,f , κ, η).
Feldman et al. [26] proved the following lower bound on the number of 1-MSTAT and VSTAT
queries needed to solve a distributional search problem. Intuitively, Theorem 2 implies that many
queries are needed to solve a distributional search problem with high statistical dimension. In
Section 4.2 we argue that the statistical dimension our distributional search problem (finding σ′
that is -correlated with the secret mapping σ given m samples from the distribution Qfσ) is high.
Theorem 2. [26, Theorems 10 and 12] For κ > 0 and η ∈ (0, 1) let d′ = SDN(Z,f , κ, η) be the
statistical dimension of the distributional search problem Z,f . Any randomized statistical algorithm
that, given access to a VSTAT
(
1
3κ2
)
oracle (resp. 1-MSTAT (L)) for the distribution Qfσ for a secret
mapping σ chosen randomly and uniformly from Znd , succeeds in finding a mapping τ ∈ Znd that is
-correlated with σ with probability Λ > η over the choice of distribution and internal randomness
requires at least Λ−η1−η d
′ (resp. Ω
(
1
L min
{
d′(Λ−η)
1−η ,
(Λ−η)2
κ2
})
) calls to the oracle.
As Feldman et al. [26] observe, almost all known algorithmic techniques can be modeled within
the statistical query framework. In particular, techniques like Expectation Maximization[25], local
search, MCMC optimization[30], first and second order methods for convex optimization, PCA,
ICA, k-means can be modeled as a statistical algorithm even with L = 2 — see [16] and [22] for
proofs. One issue is that a statistical simulation might need polynomially more samples. However,
for L > 2 we can think of our queries to 1-MSTAT(L) as evaluating L disjoint functions on a
random sample. Indeed, Feldman et al. [26] demonstrate that there is a statistical algorithm for
binary planted satisfiability problems using O˜
(
nr(f)/2
)
calls to 1-MSTAT
(
ndr(f)/2e
)
.
Remark 3. We can also use the statistical dimension to lower bound the number of queries that
an algorithm would need to make to other types of statistical oracles to solve a distributional search
problem. For example, we could also consider an oracle MVSTAT(L, T ) that takes a query h : X →
{0, . . . , L − 1} and a set S of subsets of {0, . . . , L − 1} and returns a vector v ∈ RL s.t for every
Z ∈ S ∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈Z
v[i]− pZ
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ max
{
1
T
,
√
pZ (1− pZ)
T
}
,
where pZ = Prx∼D [h(x) ∈ Z] and the cost of the query is |S|. Feldman et al. [26, Theorem 7]
proved lower bounds similar to Theorem 2 for the MVSTAT oracle. In this paper we focus on the
1-MSTAT and VSTAT oracles for simplicity of presentation.
6For the sake of simplicity we define the discrimination norm and the statistical dimension using our particular
distributional search problem Z,f . Our definition is equivalent to the definition in [26] once we fix the reference
distribution T .
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4.2 Statistical Dimension Lower Bounds
We are now ready to state our main technical result7.
Theorem 3. Let σ ∈ Znd denote a secret mapping chosen uniformly at random, let Qfσ be the
distribution over Xk×Zd induced by a function f : Zkd → Zd with distributional complexity r = r(f).
Any randomized statistical algorithm that finds an assignment τ such that τ is
(√
−2 ln(η/2)
n
)
-
correlated with σ with probability at least Λ > η over the choice of σ and the internal randomness
of the algorithm needs at least m calls to the 1-MSTAT(L) oracle (resp. VSTAT
(
nr
2(logn)2r
)
oracle)
with m · L ≥ c1
(
n
logn
)r
(resp. m ≥ nc1 logn) for a constant c1 = Ωk,1/(Λ−η)(1) which depends only
on the values k and Λ− η. In particular if we set L =
(
n
logn
)r/2
then our algorithms needs at least
m ≥ c1
(
n
logn
)r/2
calls to 1-MSTAT(L).
The proof of Theorem 3 follows from Theorems 4 and 2. Theorems 3 and 4 generalize results
of Feldman et al. [26] which only apply for binary predicates f : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}. An interested
reader can find our proofs in Appendix D. At a high level our proof proceeds as follows: Given
any function h : Xk × Zd → R we show that ∆ (σ, h) can be expressed in the following form:
∆ (σ, h) =
∑k
`=r(f)
1
|X`|b` (σ), where |X`| = Θ
(
n`
)
and each function b` has degree ` (Lemma 2).
We then use the general hypercontractivity theorem [45, Theorem 10.23] to obtain the following
concentration bound.
Lemma 1. Let b : Znd → R be any function with degree at most `, and let D′ ⊆ Znd be a set
of assignments for which d′ = dn/ |D′| ≥ e`. Then Eσ∼D′ [|b (σ)|] ≤ 2(ln d′/c0)`/2‖b‖2, where
c0 = `
(
1
2ed
)
and ‖b‖2 =
√
Ex∼Znd
[
b (x)2
]
.
We then use Lemma 1 to bound Eσ∼D′ [∆ (σ, h)] for any set D′ ⊆ Znd such that |D′| =
∣∣Zkd∣∣ /d′
(Lemma 5). This leads to the following bound on κ2(D′) = Ok
(
(ln d′/n)r(f)/2
)
.
Theorem 4. There exists a constant cQ > 0 such that for any  > 1/
√
n and q ≥ n we have
SDN
(
Z,f , cQ (log q)
r/2
nr/2
, 2e−n·
2/2
)
≥ q ,
where r = r(f) is the distributional complexity of f .
Discussion We view Theorem 3 as strong evidence for RP-CSP (Conjecture 2) because almost all
known algorithmic techniques can be modeled within the statistical query framework[16, 22]. Thus,
Theorem 3 rules out most known attacks that an adversary might mount. It also implies that many
popular heuristic based SAT solvers (e.g., DPLL[24]) will not be able to recover σ in polynomial
7We remark that for our particular family of human computable functions fk1,k2 we could get a theorem similar
to Theorem 3 by selecting σ ∼ {0, 5}n and appealing directly to results of Feldman et al. [26]. However, this theorem
would be weaker than Theorem 3 as it would only imply that a statistical algorithm cannot find an assignment σ′ that
is 1
2
− 1
10
+ -correlated with σ for  > 0. In contrast, our theorem implies that we cannot find σ′ that is -correlated.
13
time. While Theorem 3 does not rule our attacks based on Gaussian Elimination we consider this
class of attacks separately. We need m = O˜
(
ng(f)+1
)
examples to extract O(n) linear constraints
and solve for σ (see Appendix G.2). However, our composite security parameter s(f) ≥ g(f) + 1
accounts for attacks based on Gaussian Elimination.
5 Security Analysis
In the last section we presented evidence in support of RP-CSP (Conjecture 2) by showing that
any statistical adversary needs m = Ω˜
(
nr(f)/2
)
examples to (approximately) recover σ. However,
RP-CSP only says that it is hard to (approximately) recover the secret mapping σ, not that it is
hard to forge passwords. As an example consider the following NP-hard problem from learning
theory: find a 2-term DNF that is consistent with the labels in a given dataset. Just because
2-DNF is hard to learn in the proper learning model does not mean that it is NP-hard to learn a
good classifier for 2-DNF. Indeed, if we allow our learning algorithm to output a linear classifier
instead of a 2-term DNF then 2-DNF is easy to learn [37]. Could an adversary win our password
security game without properly learning the secret mapping?
Theorem 5, our main result in this section, implies that the answer is no. Informally, Theorem
5 states that any adversary that breaks UF-RCA security of our human computable password
scheme fk1,k2 can also (approximately) recover the secret mapping σ. This implies that our human
computable password scheme is UF-RCA secure as long as RP-CSP holds. Of course, for some
functions it is very easy to predict challenge-response pairs without learning σ. For example, if f
is the constant function — or any function highly correlated with the constant function — then
it is easy to predict the value of f (σ (C)). However, any function that is highly correlated with a
constant function is a poor choice for a human computable passwords scheme. We argue that any
adversary that can win the password game can be converted into an adversary that properly learns
σ provided that the output of function f is evenly distributed (Definition 7).
Definition 7. We say that the output of a function f : Zkd → Zd is evenly distributed if there
exists a function g : Zk−1d → Zd such that f (x1, . . . , xk) = g (x1, . . . , xk−1) + xk mod d.
Clearly, our family fk1,k2 has evenly distributed output. To see this we simply set g = fk1,k2−1.
We are now ready to state our main result from this section.
Theorem 5. Suppose that f has evenly distributed output, but that f is not UF−RCA (n,m, λ, δ)−
secure for δ >
(
1
d + 
)λ
. Then there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm (in n, m, λ and
1/) that extracts a string σ′ ∈ Znd that is /8-correlated with σ with probability at least 
3
(8d)2
after
seeing m+ λ example challenge response pairs.
The proof of Theorem 5 is in Appendix E. We overview the proof here. The proof of Theorem
5 uses Theorem 6 as a subroutine. Theorem 6 shows that we can, with reasonable probability, find
a mapping σ′ that is correlated with σ given predictions of f (σ (C)) for each clause as long as the
probability that each prediction is accurate is slightly better than a random guess (e.g., 1d + δ).
The proof of Theorem 6 is in Appendix E.
Theorem 6. Let f be a function with evenly distributed output (Definition 7), let σ ∼ Znd denote
the secret mapping, let  > 0 be any constant and suppose that for every C ∈ Xk we are given labels
`C ∈ Zd s.t. PrC∼Xk [f (σ (C)) = `C ] ≥ 1d + . There is a polynomial time algorithm (in n, m,1/)
that finds a mapping σ′ ∈ Znd such that σ′ is /2-correlated with σ with probability at least 2d2
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The remaining challenge in the proof of Theorem 5 is to show that there is an efficient algorithm
to extract predictions of f (σ (C)) given blackbox access to an adversary A that breaks UF-RCA
security. However, just because the adversary A gives the correct response to an entire password
challenge C1, . . . , Cλ with probability greater than
(
1
d + 
)λ
it does not mean that the response to
each individual challenge C is correct with probability 1d+. To obtain our predictions for individual
clauses C we draw λ extra example challenge response pairs (C ′1, f (σ (C ′1))) , . . . , (C ′λ, f (σ (C
′
λ))),
which we use to check the adversary. To obtain the label for a clause C we select a random index
i ∈ [λ] and give A the password challenge C ′1, . . . , C ′λ, replacing C ′i with C. If for some j < i the
label for clause C ′j is not correct (e.g., 6= f
(
σ
(
C ′j
))
) then we discard the label and try again.
Claim 2 in Appendix E shows that this process will give us predictions for individual clauses that
are accurate with probability at least 1d + .
6 Related Work
The literature on passwords has grown rapidly over the past decade (e.g., see [40, 46, 18, 19,
38, 15].) Perhaps most related to our paper is the work of Blocki et al. [13, 14] and Blum and
Vempala [17] on developing usable and secure password management schemes. While the password
management schemes proposed in these works are easier to use (e.g., involve less memorization
and/or computation) than our human computable password scheme, these schemes only remain
secure up to their information theoretic limit — after a very small (e.g., 1–6) number of breaches
security guarantees start to break down. By contrast, our schemes remain secure after a large (e.g.,
100) number or breaches.
In contrast to our work, password management software (e.g., PwdHash [49] or KeePass [48])
relies strong trust assumptions about the user’s computational devices. The recent breach at
LastPass8 highlights the potential danger of such strong assumptions.
Hopper and Blum [34] designed a Human Identification Protocol based on noisy parity, a learn-
ing problem that is believed to be hard9. We emphasize a few fundamental differences between our
work and the work of Hopper and Blum. First, a single digit challenge in their protocol consists of
an n-digit vector x ∈ Zn10 and the user responds with the mod 10 sum of the digits at ` ≤ n secret
locations (occasionally the user is supposed to respond with a random digit instead of the correct
response so that the adversary cannot simply use Gaussian Elimination to find the secret loca-
tions). By contrast, a single digit challenge in our protocol consists of an ordered clause of length
k  n. Second, their protocols allow for an O(n`/2)-time attack called Meet-In-The-Middle [34]
after the adversary has seen O˜(log
(
n
`
)
) challenge-response pairs. Thus, it is critically important to
select ` sufficiently large (e.g., ` = Ω(log(n))) in the Hopper-Blum protocol to defend against this
Meet-In-The-Middle attack. By contrast, we focus on computation of very simple functions over a
constant number of variables so that a human can compute the response to each challenge quickly.
In particular, we provide strong evidence that our scheme is secure against any polynomial time
attacker even if the adversary has seen up to O
(
nc·k
)
challenge-response pairs for some constant
c ≥ 1. Finally, computations in our protocols are deterministic. This is significant because humans
are not good at consciously generating random numbers [53, 27, 42] (e.g., noisy parity could be
8See https://blog.lastpass.com/2015/06/lastpass-security-notice.html/ (Retrieved 9/1/2015).
9Subsequent work [35, 31, 20, 36] has explored the use of the Hopper-Blum protocol for authentication on pervasive
devices like smartcards.
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easy to learn when humans are providing source of noise)10.
Naor and Pinkas[43] proposed using visual cryptography[44] to address a related problem: how
can a human verify that a message he received from a trusted server has not been tampered with
by an adversary? Their protocol requires the human to carry a visual transparency (a shared secret
between the human and the trusted server in the visual cryptography scheme), which he will use
to verify that messages from the trusted server have not been altered.
A related goal in cryptography, constructing pseudorandom generators in NC0, was proposed by
Goldreich [32] and by Cryan and Miltersen [23]. In Goldreich’s construction we fix C1, . . . , Cm ∈ [n]k
once and for all, and a binary predicate P : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}. The pseudorandom generator
is a function G : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, whose i’th bit G(x)[i] is given by P applied to the bits
of x specified by Ci. O’Donnel and Witmer gave evidence that the “Tri-Sum-And” predicate
(TSA (x1, . . . , x5) = x1 + x2 + x3 + x4x5 mod 2) provides near-optimal stretch. In particular,
they showed that for m = n1.5− Goldreich’s construction with the TSA predicate is secure against
subexponential-time attacks using SDP hierarchies. Our candidate human-computable password
schemes use functions f : Zk10 → Z10 instead of binary predicates. While our candidate functions are
contained in NC0, we note that an arbitrary function in NC0 is not necessarily human computable.
On a technical level our statistical dimension lower bounds extend work of Feldman et al. [26],
who considered the problem of finding a planted solution in a random binary planted constraint
satisfiability problem. We extend their analysis to handle non-binary planted constraint satisfiabil-
ity problems, and argue that our candidate human computable password schemes are secure. We
will discuss this work in more detail later in the paper.
7 Discussion
7.1 Improving Response Time
The easiest way to improve response time is to decrease λ –the number of single-digit challenges
that the user needs to solve. However, if the user wants to ensure that each of his passwords are
strong enough to resist offline dictionary attacks then he would need to select a larger value of λ
(e.g., λ ≥ 10). Fortunately, there is a natural way to circumvent this problem. The user could save
time by memorizing a mapping w : Z10 → {x x is one of 10,000 most common english words} and
responding to each challenge C with w (f (σ (C))) – the word corresponding to the digit f (σ (C)).
Now the user can create passwords strong enough to resist offline dictionary attacks by responding
to just 3–5 challenges. Even if the adversary learns the words in the user’s set he won’t be able
to mount online attacks. Predicting w (f (σ (C))) is at least as hard as predicting f (σ (C)) even if
the adversary knows the exact mapping w11.
7.2 One-Time Challenges
Malware Consider the following scenario: the adversary infects the user’s computer with a key-
logger which is never detected over the user’s lifetime. We claim that it is possible to protect the
user in this extreme scenario using our scheme by generating multiple (e.g., 106) one-time passwords
10Hopper and Blum also proposed a deterministic variant of their protocol called sum of k-mins, but this variant
is much less secure. See additional discussion in the appendix.
11In fact, it is quite likely that it is much harder for the adversary to predict w (f (σ (C))) because the adversary
will not see which word corresponds with each digit.
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for each of the user’s accounts. When we initially generate the secret mapping σ ∼ Znd we could also
generate cryptographic hashes for millions of one-time passwords H
(
~C, fk1,k2
(
σ
(
~C
)))
. While
usability concerns make this approach infeasible in a traditional password scheme (it would be far
too difficult for the user to memorize a million one-time passwords for each of his accounts), it may
be feasible to do this using a human computable password scheme. In our human computable pass-
word scheme we could select k1 and k2 large enough that s (fk1,k2) = min{k1 + 1, (k2 + 1)/2} ≥ 6.
Assuming that the user authenticates fewer than 106 times over his lifetime a polynomial time
adversary would never obtain enough challenge-response examples to learn σ. The drawback is
that fk1,k2 will take longer for a user to execute in his head.
Secure Cryptography in a Panoptic World Standard cryptographic algorithms could be
easily broken in a panoptic world where the user only has access to a semi-trusted computer (e.g.,
if a user asks a semi-trusted computer to sign a message m using a secret key sk stored on the
hard drive then the computer will respond with the correct value Sign (sk,m), but the adversary
will learn the values m and sk). Our human computable password schemes could also be used to
secure some cryptographic operations (e.g., signatures) in a panoptic world by leveraging recent
breakthroughs in program obfuscation [29]. The basic idea is to obfuscate a “password locked”
circuit Pσ,sk,r that can sign messages under a secret key sk — we need a trusted setup phase for
this step. The circuit Pσ,sk,r will only sign a message m if the user provides the correct response
to a unique (pseudorandomly generated) challenge for m.
7.3 Open Questions
Eliminating the Semi-Trusted Computer Our current scheme relies on a semi-trusted com-
puter to generate and store random public challenges. An adversary with full control over the user’s
computer might be able to extract the user’s secret if he is able to see the user’s responses to O(n)
adaptively selected password challenges. Can we eliminate the need for a semi-trusted computer?
Exact Security Bounds While we provided asymptotic security proofs for our human com-
putable password schemes, it is still important to understand how much effort an adversary would
need to expend to crack the secret mapping for specific values of n and m. Our attacks with a SAT
solver (see Appendix C) indicate that the value n = 26 is too small to provide UF-RCA security
even with small values of m (e.g., m = 50). As n increases the problem rapidly gets harder for our
SAT solver (e.g., with n = 50 and m = 1000 the solver failed to find σ). We also present a public
challenge with specific values of n and m to encourage cryptography and security researchers to
find other techniques to attack our scheme.
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A Authentication Process
In this section of the appendix we illustrate our human computable password schemes graphically.
In our examples, we use the function f = f2,2. To compute the response f (σ (C)) to a challenge C =
{x0, . . . , x13} the user computes f (σ (C)) = σ
(
xσ(x10)+σ(x11) mod 10
)
+ σ (x12) + σ (x13) mod 10
Memorizing a Random Mapping. To begin using our human computable password schemes
the user begins by memorizing a secret random mapping σ : [n]→ {0, . . . , 9} from n objects (e.g.,
letters, pictures) to digits. See Figure ?? for an example.
The computer can provide the user with mnemonics to help memorize the secret mapping σ —
see Figures 2b and 2c. For example, if we wanted to help the user remember that σ (eagle) = 2
we would show the user Figure 2b. We observe that a 10× n table of mnemonic images would be
sufficient to help the user memorize any random mapping σ. We stress that the computer will only
save the original image (e.g., Figure 2a). The mnemonic image (e.g., Figure 2b or 2c) would be
discarded after the user memorizes σ (eagle).
Single-Digit Challenges. In our scheme the user computes each of his passwords by responding
to a sequence of single-digit challenges. For f = f2,2 a single-digit challenge is a tuple C ∈ [n]14 of
fourteen objects. See Figure 5 for an example. To compute the response f (σ (C)) to a challenge C =
{x0, . . . , x13} the user computes f (σ (C)) = σ
(
xσ(x10)+σ(x11) mod 10
)
+ σ (x12) + σ (x13) mod 10.
Observe that this computation involves just three addition operations modulo ten. See Figure 1 for
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(a) Original photo (an eagle).
(b) Mnemonic to help the user
remember
σ (eagle) = 2.
(c) Mnemonic to help the user
remember
σ (eagle) = 6.
Figure 2: Mnemonics to help memorize the secret mapping σ
(a) MD,2 (b) MD,9
Figure 3: Mnemonics to help the user memorize the secret mapping σ
Figure 4: Table of Mnemonic Helpers to Help Learn Any Secret Mapping
22
Figure 5: A single-digit challenge
an example. In this example the response to the challenge C = {x0 = burger, x1 = eagle, . . . , x10 =
lightning, x11 = dog, x12 = man standing on world, x13 = kangaroo} is
f (σ (C)) = σ
(
xσ(x10)+σ(x11) mod 10
)
+ σ (x12) + σ (x13) mod 10
= σ
(
xσ(lightning)+σ(dog) mod 10
)
+σ (man standing on world) + σ (kangaroo) mod 10
= σ (x9+3 mod 10) + σ (man standing on world) + σ (kangaroo) mod 10
= σ (minions) + σ (man standing on world) + σ (kangaroo) mod 10
= 7 + 4 + 5 mod 10 = 6 .
We stress that this computation is done entirely in the user’s head. It takes the main author 7.5
seconds on average to compute each response.
Creating an Account. To help the user create an account the computer would first pick a
sequence of single-digit challenges C1, . . . , Cλ, where the security parameter is typically λ = 10,
and would display the first challenge C1 to the user — see Figure 6 for an example. To compute
the first digit of his password the user would compute f (σ (C1)). After the user types in the first
digit f (σ (C1)) of his password the computer will display the second challenge C2 to the user — see
Figure 7. After the user creates his account the computer will store the challenges C1, . . . , C10 in
public memory. The password pw = f (σ (C1)) . . . f (σ (Cλ)) will not be stored on the user’s local
computer (the authentication server may store the cryptographic hash of pw).
Authentication. Authenticating is very similar to creating an account. To help the user recom-
pute his password for an account the computer first looks up the challenges C1, . . . , Cλ which
were stored in public memory, and the user authenticates by computing his password pw =
23
Figure 6: Login Screen
Figure 7: Login Screen after the user responds to the first single-digit challenge
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f (σ (C1)) . . . f (σ (Cλ)). We stress that the single-digit challenges the user sees during authen-
tication will be the same single-digit challenges that the user saw when he created the account.
The authentication server verifies that the cryptographic hash of pw matches its record.
Helping the user remember his secret mapping. The computer keeps track of when the
user rehearses each value of his secret mapping (e.g., (i, σ (i)) for each i ∈ [n]), and reminds the
user to rehearse any part of his secret mapping that he hasn’t used in a long time. One advantage
of our human computable password scheme (compared with the Shared Cues scheme of Blocki et
al.[13] ) is that most users will use each part of their secret mapping often enough that they will
not need to be reminded to rehearse — see discussion in Section A.2. The disadvantage is that we
require the user to spend extra effort computing his passwords each time he authenticates.
A.1 Formal View
We now present a formal overview of the authentication process. Algorithm 1 outlines the initial-
ization process in which the user memorizes a secret random mapping σ generated by the user’s
computer, and Algorithm 2 outlines the account creation process. In Algorithm 2 the user generates
the password for an account i by computing the response to a sequence of random challenges C
generated by the user’s computer. The sequence of challenges are stored in public memory. We
assume that all steps in algorithms 1, 2 and 3 are executed on the user’s local computer unless
otherwise indicated. We also assume that the initialization phase (Algorithms 1 and 2) is carried
out in secret (e.g., we assume that the secret mapping is chosen in secret), but we do not assume
that the challenges are kept secret. We use (User) to denote a step completed by the human user
and we use (Server) to denote a step completed by a third-party server. Algorithm 3 illustrates
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the authentication process.
input: I1, ..., In, d, b and Mi,j for i ∈ [n], j ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1}.
Given j ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1} and i ∈ {1, . . . , n} Mi,j is a mnemonic to help the user associate
image Ii with the number j. d is whatever base the user is familiar with (typically d = 10),
and the value b contains random bits which are used to select the secret mapping σ. ;
Generate and Memorize Secret Mapping ;
for i← 1 to n do
// Using random bits b
σ (i) ∼ {0, . . . , d− 1} ;
Mi ←Mi,σ(i) ;
(User) Using Mi memorizes the association (Ii, σ (i)) for i ∈ [n]. ;
end
Algorithm 1: MemorizeMapping
input: n, i, λ, d, b and I1, ..., In.
Generate Password Challenge for account Ai. t is a security parameter which specifies how
many digits the password will contain.;
for j = 1→ λ do
Cij ∼ Xk ;
// Using random bits b
end
~Ci ←
〈
Ci1, . . . , C
i
λ
〉
;
Store record
(
i, ~Ci
)
;
for j = 1→ λ do
Load images from Cij . ;
Display Cij for the user. ;
(User) Computes qj ← f
(
σ
(
Cji
))
;
end
Send 〈q1, . . . , qλ〉 = f
(
σ
(
~Ci
))
to server i;
// H is a strong cryptographic hash function
(Server i) Stores hi = H
(
~Ci, 〈q1, . . . , qλ〉
)
;
Algorithm 2: CreateChallenge
input: Security parameter λ. Account i ∈ [m]. Challenges ~C1, . . . , ~Cm.〈
Ci1, . . . , C
i
λ
〉← ~Ci ;
// Display Single Digit Challenges
for j = 1→ λ do
(Semi-Trusted Computer) Load images from Cij .;
(Semi-Trusted Computer) Displays Cij to the user. ;
(User) Computes qj ← f
(
σ
(
Cji
))
. ;
end
(Semi-Trusted Computer) Sends 〈q1, . . . , qλ〉 to the server for account i. ;
(Server) Verifies that H
(
~Ci, 〈q1, . . . , qλ〉
)
= hi ;
Algorithm 3: Authenticate
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Our Scheme (σ ∈ Zn10) Shared Cues
User n = 100 n = 50 n = 30 SC-0 SC-1 SC-2
Very Active 0.396 0.001 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 3.93 7.54
Typical 2.14 0.039 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 10.89 19.89
Occasional 2.50 0.053 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 22.07 34.23
Infrequent 70.7 22.3 6.1 ≈ 2.44 119.77 173.92
Table 1: E [ER365]: Extra Rehearsals over the first year to re-
member σ in our scheme with f2,2 or f1,3. Compared with Shared
Cues schemes SC-0,SC-1 and SC-2[13].
A B C D
0 E 5 J
1 F 6 K
2 G 7 L
3 H 8 M
4 I 9 N
Table 2: Single-Digit
Challenge Layout in
Scheme 1
A.2 Memorizing and Rehearsing σ
After the user memorizes σ he may need to rehearse parts of the mapping periodically to ensure that
he does not forget it. How much effort does this require? Blocki et al.[13] introduced a usability
model to estimate how much extra effort that a user would need to spend rehearsing the mapping
σ. We used this model to obtain the predictions in Table 7.
Imagine that we had a program keep track of how often the user rehearsed each association
(i, σ (i)) and predict how much longer the user will safely remember the association (i, σ (i)) without
rehearsing again — updating this prediction after each rehearsal. The user rehearses the association
(i, σ (i)) naturally whenever he needs to recall the value of σ (i) while computing the password for
any of his password protected accounts. If the user is in danger of forgetting the value σ (i) then
the program sends the user a reminder to rehearse (Blocki et al.[13] call this an extra rehearsal).
Table 7 shows the value of E [ER365], the expected number of extra rehearsals that the user will
be required to do to remember the secret mapping σ during the first year. This value will depend
on how often the user rehearses σ naturally. We consider four types of users: Active, Typical,
Occasional and Infrequent. An Active user visits his accounts more frequently than a Infrequent
user. See Appendix H for specific details about how Table 7 was computed.
Discussion One of the advantages of our human computable passwords schemes is that mem-
orization is essentially a one time cost for our Very Active, Typical and Occasional users. Once
the user has memorized the mapping σ : {1, ..., n} → Zd he will get sufficient natural rehearsal to
maintain this memory. In fact, our schemes require the user to expend less extra effort rehearsing
his secret mapping than the Shared Cues password management scheme of Blocki et al. [13] (with
the exception of SC-0 – the least secure Shared Cues scheme). Intuitively, this is because human
computable password schemes require to recall σ(i) for multiple different values of i to respond to
each single-digit challenge C. To compute f2,2 (σ ({0, . . . , 13})) the user would need to recall the
values of σ(10), σ(11), σ(12), σ(13) and σ(j), where j = σ(10) + σ(11) mod 10. If the user has 10
digit passwords then he will naturally rehearse the value of σ(i) for up to fifty different values of i
each time he computes one of his passwords. While the user needs to spend extra time computing
his password each time he authenticates in our human computable password scheme, this extra
computation time gives the user more opportunities to rehearse his secret mapping.
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Table 3: Human Computable Password Challenges
n — Secret Length
m—# Challenge-Response Pairs
Scheme 1 (f2,2) Scheme 2 (f1,3)
n m Winner m Winner
100 digits
1000 N/A 500 N/A
500 N/A 300 N/A
300 N/A 200 N/A
50 digits
500 N/A 300 N/A
300 N/A 150 N/A
150 N/A 100 N/A
30 digits
300 CSP Solver 150 N/A
100 N/A 100 N/A
50 N/A 50 N/A
B Human Computable Passwords Challenge
While we provided asymptotic security bounds for our human computable password schemes in
our context it is particularly important to understand the constant factors. In our context, it
may be reasonable to assume that n ≤ 100 (e.g., the user may be unwilling to memorize longer
mappings). In this case it would be feasible for the adversary to execute an attack that takes
time proportional to 10
√
n ≤ 1010. We conjecture that in practice scheme 2 (f1,3) is slightly
weaker than scheme 1 (f2,2) when n ≤ 100 despite the fact that s (f2,2) < s (f1,3) because of
the attack described in Remark 4. This attack requires O˜
(
n1+g(f)/2
)
examples, and the run-
ning time O
(
10
√
nn3
)
may be feasible for n ≤ 100. To better understand the exact security
bounds we created several public challenges for researchers to break our human computable pass-
word schemes under different parameters (see Table 3). At this time these challenges remain
unsolved even after they were presented during the rump sessions at a cryptography confer-
ence and a security conference[12]. The challenges can be found at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/
~jblocki/HumanComputablePasswordsChallenge/challenge.htm. For each challenge we selected
a random secret mapping σ ∈ Zn10, and published (1) m single digit challenge-response pairs
(C1, f (σ (C1))) , . . . , (Cm, f (σ (Cm))), where each clause Ci is chosen uniformly at random from
Xk, and (2) 20 length—10 password challenges ~C1, . . . , ~C20 ∈ (Xk)10. The goal is to guess one of
the secret passwords pi = f
(
σ
(
~Ci
))
for some i ∈ [20].
C CSP Solver Attacks
Theorems 3 and 5 provide asymptotic security bounds (e.g., an adversary needs to see m = Ω˜
(
ns(f)
)
challenge-response pairs to forge passwords). However, in our context n is somewhat small (e.g.,
n ≤ 100). Thus, it is also important to address the following question: how many challenge-response
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m = 50 m = 100 m = 300 m = 500 m = 1000 m = 10000
n = 26 23.5 hr 40 min 4.5 hr 29 min 10 min 2 min
n = 30 HARD UNSOLVED 2.33 hr 35.5 min 10 min 20 s
n = 50 HARD HARD HARD HARD UNSOLVED 7 hr
n = 100 HARD HARD HARD HARD HARD UNSOLVED
Table 4: CSP Solver Attack on f2,2
Key: UNSOLVED – Solver failed to find solution in 2.5 days; HARD – Instance is harder than an
unsolved instance;
m = 50 m = 100 m = 300 m = 500 m = 1000 m = 10000
n = 26 8.7 hr 53 min 1.33 hr 13.5 min 6.3min 2 min
n = 30 HARD UNSOLVED 1 hr 41 min 2 min 15 s
n = 50 HARD HARD HARD HARD UNSOLVED 6.5 hr
n = 100 HARD HARD HARD HARD HARD UNSOLVED
Table 5: CSP Solver Attack on f1,3
Key: UNSOLVED – Solver failed to find solution in 2.5 days; HARD – Instance is harder than an
unsolved instance;
pairs does the adversary need to see before it becomes feasible for the adversary to recover the secret
on a modern computer? To better understand the exact security bounds of our human computable
password schemes we used a Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP) solver to attack our scheme.
We also created several public challenges to break our candidate human computable password
schemes (see Table 3).
CSP Solver Our computations were performed on a computer with a 2.83 GHz Intel Core2
Quad CPU and 4 GB of RAM. In each instance we generated a random mapping σ : [n] → Z10
and m random challenge response pairs (C, f (σ (C))) using the functions f2,2 and f1,3. We used
the Constraint Satisfaction Problem solver from the Microsoft Solver Foundations library to try to
solve for σ12. The results of this attack are shown in Tables 4 and 5. Due to limited computational
resources we terminated each instance if the solver failed to find the secret mapping within 2.5
days, and if our solver failed to find σ in 2.5 days on and instance (n,m) we did not run the solver
on strictly harder instances (e.g., (n′,m′) with n′ ≥ n and m′ ≤ m). We remark that our empirical
results are consistent with the hypothesis that the time/space resources consumed by the CSP
solver increase exponentially in n (e.g., when we decrease n from 30 to 26 with m = 100 examples
the CSP solver can solve for σ ∈ Z2610 in 40 minutes, while the solver failed to find σ ∈ Z3010 in 2.5
days and we observe similar threshold behavior in other columns of the table. ).
D Statistical Dimension
At a high level our statistical dimension lower bounds closely mirror the lower bounds from [26]
for binary predicates. For example, Lemmas 2, 3, 1, 4 and 5 are similar to Lemmas 2, 4, 5, 6 and
12http://blogs.msdn.com/b/solverfoundation/ (Retrieved 9/15/2014).
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7 from [26] respectively.
While the high level proof strategy is very similar, we stress that our lower bounds do requires
new ideas because we are working with planted solutions σ ∈ Znd instead of σ ∈ Znd . We use the
basis functions χα where for α ∈ Znd is
χα (x) = exp
(−2pi√−1 (x · α)
d
)
.
Note that if d > 2 then the Fourier coefficients bˆα of a function b : Zkd → R might include complex
numbers. While we need to take care to deal with the possibility that a Fourier coefficients might
be complex, we are still able to apply powerful tools from Fourier analysis. For example, Parseval’s
identity ∑
α∈Zkd
∣∣∣bˆα∣∣∣2 = Ex∼Zkd [b (x)2] ,
still applies and there are versions of the hypercontractivity theorem [45, Chapter 10] that still
apply even when Fourier coefficients are complex.
Another difference is that the reference distribution is defined over clauses and outputs Xk×Zd
(instead of just clauses Xk) because we are working with a function f : Znd → Zd with non-binary
outputs. Some care is needed in finding the right reference distribution. Unlike [26] we cannot
just use the uniform distribution over Xk × Zd as a reference distribution — instead the reference
distribution inherently depends on the function f (Of course it is must still be independent of σ).
The following definition will be useful in our proofs.
Definition 8. Given a clause C ∈ Xk and S ⊆ [k] of size `, we let C|S ∈ X` denote the clause of
variables of C at the positions with indices in S (e.g., if C = (1, . . . , k) and S = {1, 5, k − 2} then
C|S = (1, 5, k − 2) ∈ X3). Given a function h : Xk × Zd → R, a clause C` ∈ X` and i ∈ Zd and a
set S ⊆ [k] of size |S| = ` we define
hiS (C`) =
|X`|
|Xk|
∑
C∈Xk,C|S=C`
h (C, i) .
We first show that ∆ (σ, h) can be expressed in terms of the Fourier coefficients of Qˆ as well as
the functions h`. In particular, given a function h : Xk × Zd → R we define the degree ` function
b` : Znd → C as follows
b` (σ)
.
=
1
2
∑
α∈Z`d:H(α)=`
(
k
`
) d−1∑
i=0
Qˆf,iα
∑
C∈X`
χα (σ (C))h
i
`(C) .
Lemma 2 states that
∆ (σ, h) =
k∑
`=1
1
|X`|b` (σ) .
This observation will be important later because we can use hypercontractivity to bound the ex-
pected value of |b` (σ)|. Notice that if Q has distributional complexity r and ` ≤ r then b` (σ) = 0
because Qˆf,iα = 0 for all i ∈ Zd and α ∈ Zkd s.t. 1 ≤ H (α) ≤ r. This means that first r terms of the
sum in Lemma 2 will be zero.
30
Lemma 2. For every σ ∈ Zkd, j ∈ Zd and h : Xk → R we have ∆ (σ, h) =
∑k
`=1
1
|X`|b` (σ) .
Proof of Lemma 2. Before calculating we first observe that for any j ∈ Zd we have
Qˆf,j~0 = Ex∼Zkd
[
Qf,j (x)χα (x)
]
= Ex∼Zkd
[
Qf,j (x)
]
=
∑
x∈Zkd
Qf,j (x)
dk
=
2− d
d
.
Given α ∈ Zkd we also define Sα ⊂ [k] to be the set of indices i s.t. αi 6= 0 — |Sα| = H(α). Now we
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note that
∆ (σ, h) = EC∼Xk [h (C, f (σ (C)))]− E(C,i)∼T [h (C, i)]
=
∑
C∈Xk
(
h
(
C, f(σ(C))
)
|Xk| −
d−1∑
i=0
Pr
T
[(C, i)]h(C, i)
)
=
∑
C∈Xk
(
h
(
C, f(σ(C))
)
|Xk| −
d−1∑
i=0
Prx∼Zkd [f(x) = i]
|Xk| h(C, i)
)
=
∑
C∈Xk
d−1∑
i=0
h(C, i)
(
Qf,iσ (C)+1
2 − Prx∼Zkd [f(x) = i]
)
|Xk|

=
∑
C∈Xk
d−1∑
i=0
h(C, i)
|Xk|
1
2
− Pr
x∼Zkd
[f(x) = i] +
∑
α∈Zkd
Qˆf,iα χα (σ (C))
2

=
∑
C∈Xk
d−1∑
i=0
h(C, i)|Xk|
1
d
− Pr
x∼Zkd
[f(x) = i] +
∑
α∈Zkd :α 6=~0
Qˆf,iα χα (σ (C))
2


=
∑
C∈Xk
d−1∑
i=0
h(C, i)|Xk|
 ∑
α∈Zkd :α 6=~0
Qˆf,iα χα (σ (C))
2


=
∑
C∈Xk
d−1∑
i=0
h(C, i)
|Xk|
 k∑
`=1
∑
α∈Zkd :H(α)=`
Qˆf,iα χα (σ (C))
2

=
1
2 |Xk|
k∑
`=1
∑
C∈Xk
d−1∑
i=0
h(C, i)
 ∑
α∈Zkd :H(α)=`
Qˆf,iα χα (σ (C))

=
1
2 |Xk|
k∑
`=1
∑
α∈Zkd :H(α)=`
∑
C∈Xk
d−1∑
i=0
(
h(C, i)
(
Qˆf,iα χα (σ (C))
))
=
1
2 |Xk|
k∑
`=1
∑
α∈Zkd :H(α)=`
d−1∑
i=0
Qˆf,iα
∑
C`∈X`
∑
C∈Xk,C|Sα=C`
χα (σ (C))h
i(C)
=
1
2 |Xk|
k∑
`=1
∑
α∈Z`d:H(α)=`
(
k
`
) d−1∑
i=0
Qˆf,iα
∑
C`∈X`
∑
C∈Xk,C|Sα=C`
χα (σ (C`))h(C, i)
=
k∑
`=1
1
2 |X`|
∑
α∈Z`d:H(α)=`
(
k
`
) d−1∑
i=0
Qˆf,iα
∑
C`∈X`
χα (σ (C`))h
i
Sα(C)
=
k∑
`=1
1
|X`|b`(σ) .
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
The following lemma is similar to Lemma 4 from [26]. Lemma 3 is based on the general
hypercontractivity theorem [45, Chapter 10] and applies to more general (non-boolean) functions.
Lemma 3. [45, Theorem 10.23] If b : Znd → R has degree at most ` then for any t ≥
(√
2ed
)`
,
Pr
x∼Znd
[|b(x)| ≥ t‖b‖2] ≤ 1
d`
exp
(
− `
2ed
t2/`
)
,
where ‖b‖2 =
√
Ex∼Znd
[
b (x)2
]
Lemma 1 and its proof are almost identical to Lemma 5 in [26]. We simply replace their concen-
tration bounds with the concentration bounds in Lemma 3. We include the proof for completeness.
Reminder of Lemma 1. Let b : Znd → R be any function with degree at most `, and let D′ ⊆ Znd
be a set of assignments for which d′ = dn/ |D′| ≥ e`. Then Eσ∼D′ [|b (σ)|] ≤ 2(ln d′/c0)`/2‖b‖2,
where c0 = `
(
1
2ed
)
and ‖b‖2 =
√
Ex∼Znd
[
b (x)2
]
.
Proof of Lemma 1. The set D′ contains 1/d′ fraction of points in Znd . Therefore,
Pr
x∼D′
[|b(x)| ≥ t‖b‖2] ≤ d
′
d`
exp
(
− `
2ed
t2/`
)
,
for any t ≥
(√
2ed
)`
. For any random variable Y and value a ∈ R,
E[Y ] ≤ a+
∫ ∞
a
Pr[Y ≥ t] dt .
We set Y = |b (σ)| /‖b‖2 and a =
(
ln d′
c0
)`/2
. Assuming that a >
(√
2ed
)`
we get
Eσ∼D′ [|b(σ)|]
‖b‖2 ≤
(
ln d′
c0
)`/2
+
∫ ∞
(ln d′/c0)`/2
d′
d`
· e−c0t2/`dt
= (ln d′/c0)`/2 +
` · d′
2d` · c`/20
·
∫ ∞
ln d′
e−zz`/2−1dz .
Let u(i)
.
=
∫∞
ln d′ e
−zz`/2−idz. Applying integration by parts we have
u(i)
.
=
∫ ∞
ln d′
e−zz`/2−idz =
(
e−zz`/2−i+1
)∣∣∣∞
ln d′
+
∫ ∞
ln d′
e−zz`/2−i+1dz −
(
`
2
− i
)∫ ∞
ln d′
e−zz`/2−idz
=
(
e−zz`/2−i+1
)∣∣∣∞
ln d′
+ u(i− 1)−
(
`
2
− i
)
u(i) .
Thus,
u(i− 1) =
(
`
2
− i+ 1
)
u(i)−
(
e−zz`/2−i+1
)∣∣∣∞
ln d′
=
(
`
2
− i+ 1
)
u(i) +
(ln d′)
`
2
−i+1
d′
.
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Unrolling the recurrence for T ≥ 1 we get
u(1) =
(ln d′)
`
2
d′
+
T−1∑
i=1
(ln d′)
`
2
−i
d′
i∏
j=1
(
`
2
− j + 1
)
+ u (T + 1)
T∏
j=1
(
`
2
− j + 1
)
.
We also note that for T = d `2 + 1e we have u (T + 1)
∏T
j=1
(
`
2 − j + 1
) ≤ 0. This follows because
u(T + 1) ≥ 0 for any integer T ≥ 0 and ∏Tj=1 ( `2 − j + 1) ≤ 0. It follows that
u(1) ≤ (ln d
′)
`
2
d′
+
d `
2
+1e∑
i=1
(ln d′)
`
2
−i
d′
i∏
j=1
(
`
2
− j + 1
)
≤ (ln d
′)
`
2
d′
1 + d `2+1e∑
i=1
`−i
(
`
2
)i ≤ 2 (ln d′) `2
d′
where we used the condition d′ ≥ e` to obtain the second to last inequality. Now we have
Eσ∼D′ [|b(σ)|]
‖b‖2 ≤ (ln d
′/c0)`/2 +
` · d′
2d` · c`/20
· u(1)
≤ (ln d′/c0)`/2 + ` · d
′
2d` · c`/20
·
(
2 (ln d′)
`
2
d′
)
≤ 2(ln d′/c0)`/2 .

Lemma 4. Let D′ ⊆ {0, . . . , d− 1}n be a set of assignments for which d′ = dn/ |D′|. Then
Eσ∼D′
[∣∣∣∣ 1|X`|b` (σ)
∣∣∣∣] ≤ 2((k`
)√
`!d
)(
ln d′/c0
)`/2
max
α∈Z`d
d−1∑
i=0
‖hSα (σ) ‖2√|X`| .
Proof. For simplicity of notation we set b = b`. Our first goal will be to find the Fourier coefficients
of
b(σ) =
1
2
∑
α∈Z`d:H(α)=`
(
k
`
) d−1∑
i=0
Qˆf,iα
∑
C∈X`
χα (σ (C))h
i
Sα(C) .
Given α = (α1, . . . , α`) ∈ Z`d with H(α) = ` and a clause C = (c1, ..., c`) ∈ X` we define the
projection αC ∈ Z`d of α onto C to be the unique vector s.t. αCci = αi for each i ≤ ` and αj = 0 for
each j /∈ {c1, . . . , c`} — note that H(αC) = ` .
Given α, α′ ∈ Zkd with H(α) = H(α′) = ` and C,C ∈ X` we say that the pairs (α,C`) and
(α′, C ′`) are equivalent if and only if their projections are equal α
C = α′C′13. We can partition the
set {α ∈ Zkd : H (α) = `} ×X` into equivalence classes E1, . . . , Et. If the pairs (α,C`) and (α′, C ′`)
are equivalent then we observe that the clauses C and C ′ must contain the same variables though
perhaps in a different order. Furthermore, given an equivalence class Ej such that (α,C) ∈ Ej we
13For example, if C = (1, 2, 5), C = (1, 5, 2) and α = (4, 5, 6) and α′ = (4, 6, 5) then the pairs (α,C`) and (α′, C′`)
are equivalent.
34
have (α′, C) /∈ Ej for any α′ 6= α ∈ Zkd. Thus each equivalence class has size `! because there are `!
ways to reorder the ` variables in a clause C. We can rewrite b(σ) as
b(σ) =
(
k
`
)
2
t∑
j=1
∑
(α,C)∈Ej
d−1∑
i=0
Qˆf,iα h
i
Sα(C)χα(σ(C))
Let (α,C) ∈ Ej then the Fourier coefficient of αC is
bˆj = bˆαC =
(
k
`
)
2
∑
(α′,C′)∈Ej
d−1∑
i=0
Qˆf,iα h
i
`(C
′) .
We also note that t = |X`|(d−1)
k
`! .
Now we can apply Parseval’s identity along with the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality to obtain
Eσ∼Znd
[
b (σ) b (σ)
]
= Eσ∼Znd
[
|b (σ)|2
]
= Eσ∼Znd
 t∑
j=1
∣∣∣bˆj∣∣∣2

=
(
k
`
)2
4
Eσ∼Znd
 t∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
(C,α)∈Ej
d−1∑
i=0
Qˆf,iα h
i
Sα(C)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤
(
k
`
)2
4
Eσ∼Znd
 t∑
j=1
 ∑
(C,α)∈Ej
d−1∑
i=0
∣∣∣Qˆf,iα ∣∣∣2
 ∑
(C,α)∈Ej
d−1∑
i=0
∣∣hiSα(C)∣∣2

≤
(
k
`
)2
4
Eσ∼Znd
 t∑
j=1
(
`! max
j≤t,(C,α)∈Ej
d−1∑
i=0
∣∣∣Qˆf,iα ∣∣∣2
) ∑
(C,α)∈Ej
d−1∑
i=0
∣∣hiSα(C)∣∣2

≤
(
k
`
)2
4
Eσ∼Znd
(`! max
j≤t,(C,α)∈Ej
d−1∑
i=0
∣∣∣Qˆf,iα ∣∣∣2
) t∑
j=1
∑
(C,α)∈Ej
d−1∑
i=0
∣∣hiSα(C)∣∣2

≤
(
k
`
)2
4
Eσ∼Znd
(`! max
j≤t,(C,α)∈Ej
d−1∑
i=0
∣∣∣Qˆf,iα ∣∣∣2
)max
α∈Z`d
∑
C∈X`
d−1∑
i=0
∣∣hiSα(C)∣∣2

≤
(
k
`
)2
4
Eσ∼Znd
[(
`! max
j≤t,(C,α)∈Ej
d−1∑
i=0
∣∣∣Qˆf,iα ∣∣∣2
)(
|X`|max
α∈Z`d
d−1∑
i=0
EC∼X`
[
hiSα(C)
2
])]
≤
(
k
`
)2
d`! |X`|
4
Eσ∼Znd
[(
max
j≤t,(C,α)∈Ej
d−1∑
i=0
∣∣∣Qˆf,iα ∣∣∣2
)]
max
α∈Z`d
d−1∑
i=0
‖hiSα‖22
≤
(
k
`
)2
d`! |X`|
4
max
α∈Z`d
d−1∑
i=0
‖hiSα‖22 .
Before we can apply Lemma 1 we must address a technicality. The range of b = b` might include
complex numbers, but Lemma 1 only applies to functions b with range R. For c, d ∈ R we adopt
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the notation Im
(
c+ d
√−1) = d and Re (c+ d√−1) = c. We observe that
Eσ∼Znd
[
b (σ) b (σ)
]
= Eσ∼Znd
[
Re (b (σ))2 + Im (b (σ))2
]
= ‖Re (b) ‖22 + ‖Im (b) ‖22 .
We first observe that Re (b) and Im (b) are both degree ` functions because b is a degree `
function.
Now we can apply Lemma 1 to get
Eσ∼D′ [|Re (b (σ))|] ≤ 2 (ln d
′/c0)`/2
d`
‖Re(b)‖2
≤ 2 (ln d
′/c0)`/2
d`
√
Eσ∼Znd
[
b (σ) b (σ)
]
≤
((
k
`
)√
`!d
)(
ln d′/c0
)`/2√|X`|max
α∈Z`d
d∑
i=0
‖hSα (σ) ‖2 .
A symmetric argument can be used to bound Eσ∼D′ [Im (b (σ))]. Now because
|b (σ)| ≤ |Re (b (σ))|+ |Im (b (σ))| ,
it follows that
Eσ∼D′
[∣∣∣∣ 1|X`|b (σ)
∣∣∣∣] ≤ 2((k`
)√
`!d
)(
1
|X`|
)((
ln d′/c0
)`/2)
max
α∈Z`d
d−1∑
i=0
‖hSα (σ) ‖2
√
|X`|
≤ 2
((
k
`
)√
`!d
)(
ln d′/c0
)`/2
max
α∈Z`d
d−1∑
i=0
‖hSα (σ) ‖2√|X`| .
We will use Fact 2 to prove Lemma 5. The proof of Fact 2 is found in [26, Lemma 7]. We
include it here for completeness.
Fact 2. [26] If h : Xk × Zd → R satisfies ‖h‖22 = 1 then for any i ∈ Zd, 0 ≤ ` ≤ k and S ⊆ [k] of
size |S| = ` we have ∑d−1i=0 ‖hiS‖22 ≤ d.
Proof. First notice that for any C`, S ⊆ [k] s.t |S| = `∣∣{C ∈ Xk C|S = C`}∣∣ = |Xk||X`| .
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By applying the definition of h` along with the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality
d−1∑
i=0
‖hiS‖22 =
d−1∑
i=0
EC`∼X`
[
hiS (C`)
2
]
=
( |X`|
|Xk|
)2 d−1∑
i=0
EC`∼X`
 ∑
C∈Xk,C|S=C`
h (C, i)
2
≤
( |X`|
|Xk|
)2 d−1∑
i=0
EC`∼X`
 |Xk|
|X`|
 ∑
C∈Xk,C|S=C`
h (C, i)2

≤
( |X`|
|Xk|
)
dEC`∼X`,i∼Zd
 ∑
C∈Xk,C|S=C`
h (C, i)2

= dEC∼Uk
[
h (C)2
]
= d‖h‖22 = d .
Lemma 5. Let r = r(f), let D′ ⊆ {0, . . . , d− 1}n be a set of secret mappings and let d′ = dn/|D′|.
Then κ2(D′) = Ok
(
(ln d′/n)r/2
)
Proof. Let h : Xk → R be any function such that EUk
[
h2
]
= 1. Using Lemma 2 and the definition
of r,
|∆ (σ, h)| =
∣∣∣∣∣
k∑
`=r
1
|X`|b` (σ)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
k∑
`=r
∣∣∣∣ 1|X`|b` (σ)
∣∣∣∣ .
We apply Lemma 4 and Fact 2 to get
Eσ∼D′ [|∆ (σ, h)|] ≤ 2
k∑
`=r
(
k
`
)√
`!d
(
ln d′/c0
)`/2
max
α∈Zd
d−1∑
i=0
‖hiSα (σ) ‖2√|X`|
≤
k∑
`=r
((
k
`
)
d
√
`!
)(
2 (ln d′/c0)`/2√|X`|
)
≤ Ok
(
(ln d′)`/2
nr/2
)
.
Reminder of Theorem 4. There exists a constant cQ > 0 such that for any  > 1/
√
n and
q ≥ n we have
SDN
(
Z,f , cQ (log q)
r/2
nr/2
, 2e−n·
2/2
)
≥ q ,
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where r = r(f) is the distributional complexity of f .
Proof of Theorem 4. First note that, by Chernoff bounds, for any solution τ ∈ Znd the fraction of
assignments σ ∈ Znd such that τ and σ are -correlated (e.g., H (σ, τ) ≤ n(d−1)d −  · n) is at most
e−2n·2 . In other words |Dσ| ≥
(
1− e−2n·2
)
|Znd |, where Dσ = Znd \
{
σ′ H (σ, σ′) ≤ n(d−1)d −  · n
}
Let D′ ⊆ Dσ be a set of distributions of size |Dσ|/q. Then for d′ = dn/|D′| = q ·dn/|Dσ|, by Lemma
5 we get
κ2(D′) = Ok
(
(ln d′)r/2
nr/2
)
(1)
= Ok
(
(ln q)r/2
nr/2
)
, (2)
where the last line follows by Sterling’s Approximation
q = d′|Dσ|/dn = d′|Dσ|/dn ≈ d′c′
√
d
n
for a constant c′. The claim now follows from the definition of SDN. 
The proof of Theorem 3 follows from Theorem 4 and the following result of Feldman et al. [26].
Reminder of Theorem 2 [26, Theorems 10 and 12]. For κ > 0 and η ∈ (0, 1) let
d′ = SDN(Z,f , κ, η) be the statistical dimension of the distributional search problem Z,f . Any
randomized statistical algorithm that, given access to a VSTAT
(
1
3κ2
)
oracle (resp. 1-MSTAT (L))
for the distribution Qfσ for a secret mapping σ chosen randomly and uniformly from Znd , succeeds
in finding a mapping τ ∈ Znd that is -correlated with σ with probability Λ > η over the choice of
distribution and internal randomness requires at least Λ−η1−η d
′ (resp. Ω
(
1
L min
{
d′(Λ−η)
1−η ,
(Λ−η)2
κ2
})
)
calls to the oracle.
Reminder of Theorem 3. Let σ ∈ Znd denote a secret mapping chosen uniformly at random,
let Qfσ be the distribution over Xk × Zd induced by a function f : Zkd → Zd with distributional
complexity r = r(f). Any randomized statistical algorithm that finds an assignment τ such that
τ is
(√
−2 ln(η/2)
n
)
-correlated with σ with probability at least Λ > η over the choice of σ and
the internal randomness of the algorithm needs at least m calls to the 1-MSTAT(L) oracle (resp.
VSTAT
(
nr
2(logn)2r
)
oracle) with m · L ≥ c1
(
n
logn
)r
(resp. m ≥ nc1 logn) for a constant c1 =
Ωk,1/(Λ−η)(1) which depends only on the values k and Λ− η. In particular if we set L =
(
n
logn
)r/2
then our algorithms needs at least m ≥ c1
(
n
logn
)r/2
calls to 1-MSTAT(L).
E Security Proofs
Reminder of Theorem 6. Let f be a function with evenly distributed output (Definition 7), let
σ ∼ Znd denote the secret mapping, let  > 0 be any constant and suppose that for every C ∈ Xk we
are given labels `C ∈ Zd s.t. PrC∼Xk [f (σ (C)) = `C ] ≥ 1d + . There is a polynomial time algorithm
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(in n, m,1/) that finds a mapping σ′ ∈ Znd such that σ′ is /2-correlated with σ with probability at
least 
2d2
Proof of Theorem 6. Let f : Zkd → Zd be a function with evenly distributed output. We select
fix C−1 ∼ Xk−1 and i ∼ [n] \ C−1. Given j ∈ [n] \ C−1 we let Cj = (C−1, j) ∈ Xk denote the
corresponding clause. Now we generate the mapping σ′ by selecting σ′(i) at random, and setting
σ′(j) = σ′(i) + `Cj − `Ci mod d for j ∈ [n] \ Ci. For j ∈ C−1 we select σ′(j) at random. We let
GOOD
(
C−1, i, σ′
)
denote the event that
Pr
j∼[n]\C−1
[
`Cj = f (σ (Cj))
] ≥ 1
d
+ /2 ,
σ′(i) = σ(i) and `Ci = f (σ (Ci)). Assume that the event GOOD
(
C−1, i
)
occurs, in this case for
each j s.t. `Cj = f (σ (Cj)) we have
σ′(j)− σ(j) ≡ (σ′(i) + `Cj − `Ci)− σ(j) mod d
≡ (`Cj − `Ci)+ σ(i)− σ(j) mod d
≡ g (σ (C−1))+ σ (j)− (g (σ (C−1))+ σ (i))+ σ(i)− σ(j) mod d
≡ 0 mod d .
Therefore, we have
n−H (σ, σ′)
n
≥ 1
d
+ /2− k − 1
n
.
We note that by Markov’s inequality the probability of success is at least
Pr
C−1∼Xk−1
[
GOOD
(
C−1
)] ≥ 
2d2
.

Before proving Theorem 5 we introduce some notation and prove an important claim. We use
AC1,...,Cm : (Xk)λ → Zλd to denote an adversary who sees the challenges C1, . . . , Cm ∈ Xk and
the corresponding responses f (σ (C1)) , . . . , f (σ (Cm)). AC1,...,Cm (C ′1, . . . , C ′λ) ∈ Zλd denotes the
adversaries prediction of f (σ (C ′1)) , . . . , f (σ (C ′λ)). Given a function b : (Xk)
λ → Zλd , challenges
C ′1, . . . , C ′λ ∈ Xk and responses f (σ (C ′1)) , . . . , f (σ (C ′λ)) we use Pb,i,C′1,...,C′m : Xk × [t]→ Zd ∪ {⊥}
to predict the value of a clause C ∈ Xk
Pb,C′1,...,C′λ (C, i) =
{
b
(
Cˆ1, . . . , Cˆλ
)
[i], if f
(
σ
(
Cˆj
))
= b
(
Cˆ1, . . . , Cˆλ
)
[j] ∀j < i
⊥, otherwise
where Cˆi = C and Cˆj = C
′
j for j 6= i. We allow our predictor Pb,C′1,...,C′λ (C, i) to output ⊥ when it
is unsure. Informally, Claim 2 says that for b = AC1,...,Cm our predictor Pb,i,C′1,...,C′m is reasonably
accurate whenever it is not unsure. Briefly, Claim 2 follows because for b = AC1,...,Cm we have
Pr [Wins (A, n,m, λ)] =
d∏
i=1
Pr
C∼Xk
C1,...,Cm∼Xk
C′1,...,C
′
λ∼Xk
[
Pb,C′1,...,C′λ (C, i) = f (σ (C)) Pb,C′1,...,C′λ (C, i) 6= ⊥
]
.
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Claim 2. Let A be an adversary s.t Pr [Wins (A, n,m, λ)] > (1d + )λ and let b = AC1,...,Cm then
Pr
i∼[λ],C∼Xk
C1,...,Cm∼Xk
C′1,...,C
′
λ∼Xk
[
Pb,C′1,...,C′λ (C, i) = f (σ (C)) Pb,C′1,...,C′λ (C, i) 6= ⊥
]
≥
(
1
d
+ 
)
.
Proof of Claim 2. We draw examples (C1, f (σ (C1))) , . . . , (Cm, f (σ (Cm))) to construct b =
AC1,...,Cm . Given a random length-λ password challenge (C ′1, . . . , C ′λ) ∈ (Xk)t we let
pj = Pr
C,C1,...,Cm,C′1,...,C
′
λ∼Xk
[
Pb,j,C′1,...,C′t (C) = f (σ (C)) Pb,j,C′1,...,C′λ (C) 6= ⊥
]
denote the probability that the adversary correctly guesses the response to the j’th challenge
conditioned on the event that the adversary correctly guesses all of the earlier challenges. Observe
that
Pr
C,C1,...,Cm,C′1,...,C
′
λ−1∼Xk,i∼[t]
[
Pb,i,C′1,...,C′λ (C, i) = f (σ (C))
]
=
λ∑
i=1
pi/λ ,
so it suffices to show that
∑λ
i=1 pi/λ ≥ 1d + . We obtain the following constraint
λ∏
i=1
pi =
λ∏
i=1
Pr
C,C1,...,Cm,C′1,...,C
′
λ∼Xk
[
Pb,j,C′1,...,C′λ (C) = f (σ (C)) Pb,j,C′1,...,C′λ (C) 6= ⊥
]
=
λ∏
i=1
Pr
C1,...,Cm,C′1,...,C
′
λ∼Xk
[AC1,...,Cm (C ′1, . . . , C ′λ) [i] = f (σ (C ′i)) ∀j < i. AC1,...,Cm (C ′1, . . . , C ′λ) [j] = f (σ (C ′j))]
= Pr
C1,...,Cm,C′1,...,C
′
λ∼Xk
[AC1,...,Cm (C ′1, . . . , C ′λ) = (f (σ (C ′1)) , . . . , f (σ (C ′λ)))]
≥
(
1
d
+ 
)λ
.
If we minimize
∑t
i=1 pi/λ subject to the constraint
∏λ
i=1 pi ≥
(
1
d + 
)λ
then we obtain the
desired upper bound
∑λ
i=1 pi/λ ≥ 1d + . 
Reminder of Theorem 5. Suppose that f has evenly distributed output, but that f is not
UF − RCA (n,m, λ, δ) − secure for δ > (1d + )λ. Then there is a probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm (in n, m, λ and 1/) that extracts a string σ′ ∈ Znd that is /8-correlated with σ with
probability at least 
3
(8d)2
after seeing m+ λ example challenge response pairs.
Proof of Theorem 5. Given random clauses C1, . . . , Cm, C
′
1, . . . , C
′
λ ∼ Xk we let Good (C1, . . . , Cm, C ′1, . . . , C ′λ)
denote the event that
Pr
i∼[t],C∼Xk
[
Pb,C′1,...,C′λ (C, i) = f (σ (C)) Pb,C′1,...,C′λ (C, i) 6= ⊥
]
≥
(
1
d
+

2
)
.
By Markov’s Inequality and Claim 2 we have Pr [Good (C1, . . . , Cm, C
′
1, . . . , C
′
λ)] ≥ 2 . Here, b =
AC1,...,Cm and
Pb,C′1,...,C′λ (C, i) =
{
b
(
Cˆ1, . . . , Cˆλ
)
[i], if f
(
σ
(
Cˆj
))
= b
(
Cˆ1, . . . , Cˆλ
)
[j] ∀j < i
⊥, otherwise
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Assuming that the event Good (C1, . . . , Cm, C
′
1, . . . , C
′
λ) occurs we obtain labels for each clause
C ∈ Xk by selecting a random permutation pi : [λ] → [λ], setting i = 1 and setting `C =
Pb,C′1,...,C′λ (C, pi(i)) — if `C 6= ⊥ then we increment i and repeat. Note that we will always find a
label `C 6= ⊥ within t attempts because Pb,C′1,...,C′λ (C, 1) 6= ⊥. Let GoodLabels denote the event
that
Pr
C∼Xk
[GC ] ≥ 1
d
+

4
,
where GC is the indicator random variable for the event `C = f (σ (C)). We have
E
 1
|Xk|
∑
C∈Xk
GC
 ≥ 1
d
+

2
,
so we can invoke Markov’s inequality again to argue that Pr [GoodLabels Good] ≥ 4 . If the
event GoodLabels occurs then we can invoke Theorem 6 to obtain σ′ that is /8-correlated with
σ with probability at least 
8d2
. Our overall probability of success is

8d2
× 
4
× 
2
=
3
(8d)2
.

F Security Parameters of fk1,k2
Reminder of Claim 1. Let 0 ≤ k1 and k2 > 0 be given and let f = fk1,k2 we have g(f) =
min{k1, 10}, r(f) = k2 + 1 and s(f) = min
{
k2+1
2 , k1 + 1, 11
}
.
Proof of Claim 1. Let f(x) = fk1,k2(x) = x
(∑9+k1
i=10 xi mod 10
) + ∑9+k1+k2i=10+k1 xi mod 10. We first
observe that if we fix the values of x10, . . . , x9+k1 ∈ Z10 and let i′ =
∑9+k1
i=10 xi mod 10 then
f ′ (x0, . . . , x9, x10+k1 , . . . , x9+k1+k2) = xi′ +
∑9+k1+k2
i=10+k1
xi mod 10 is a linear function. Similarly,
if we fix the values of x0 = . . . = x9 = c then the resulting function f
′ (x10, . . . , x9+k1+k2) =
c +
∑9+k1+k2
i=10+k1
xi mod 10 is linear. Thus, g(f) ≤ min{10, k1}. Now suppose that we don’t fix all
of the values x10, . . . , x9+k1 ∈ Z10 and at least one of the variables x0, . . . , x9 is not fixed. In this
case the resulting function will not be linear. Thus, g (f) ≥ min{k1, 10}. We also note that for any
α ∈ Z10+k1+k210 s.t. H (α) ≤ k2 and i, t ∈ Z10 that
Pr
x∼Z10+k1+k210
[f(x) = t α · x ≡ i mod 10] = Pr
x∼Z10+k1+k210
[f(x) = t] =
1
10
.
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Therefore,
Qˆf,tα = Ex∼Z10+k1+k210
[
Qf,t (x)χα (x)
]
=
9∑
i=0
Pr [α · x ≡ i mod 10]E
x∼Z10+k1+k210
[
Qf,t (x)χα (x) α · x ≡ i mod 10
]
=
9∑
i=0
exp
(−2pii√−1
10
)
Pr [α · x ≡ i mod 10]E
x∼Z10+k1+k210
[
Qf,t (x) α · x ≡ i mod 10
]
=
1
10
9∑
i=0
exp
(−2pii√−1
10
)
E
x∼Z10+k1+k210
[
Qf,t (x) α · x ≡ i mod 10
]
= 0 ,
which implies that r(f) ≥ k2 + 1. Similarly, if we set α = (α0, . . . , α9+k1+k2) such that α0 = 1 and
α10+k1 = . . . = α9+k1+k2 = 1 so that α has hamming weight k2 +1 then we can verify that Qˆ
f,t
α 6= 0.

G Security Upper Bounds
G.1 Statistical Algorithms
Theorem 7 demonstrates that our lower bound for statistical algorithms are asymptotically tight
for our human computable password schemes fk1,k2 . In particular, we demonstrate that m =
O˜
(
n(k2+1)/2
)
queries to 1-MSTAT are sufficient for a statistical algorithm to recover σ.
Theorem 7. For f = fk1,k2 there is a randomized algorithm that makes O
(
nmax{1,(k2+1)/2} log2 n
)
calls to the 1-MSTAT
(
ndr(fi)/2e
)
oracle and returns σ with probability 1− o(1).
For binary functions f ′ : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}, Feldman et al. [26] gave a randomized statistical
algorithm to find σ′ ∈ {0, 1}n using just O (nr(f)/2 log2 n) calls to the 1-MSTAT (ndr(f)/2e) oracle.
Their main technique is a discrete spectral iteration procedure to find the eigenvector (singular
vector) with the largest eigenvalue (singular value) of a matrix M sampled from a distribution
Mσ′,p over
∣∣Xbr(f)/2c∣∣× ∣∣Xdr(f)/2e∣∣ matrices. With probability 1− o(1) this eigenvector will encode
the value
∑
i∈C σ
′ (i) mod 2 for each clause C ∈ Xr(f)/2. We show that the discrete spectral
iteration algorithm of Feldman et al [26] can be extended to recover σ ∈ Z10 when fk1,k2 is one of
our candidate human computable functions.
Discussion We note that Theorem 7 cannot be extended to arbitrary functions f : Zkd → Zd.
Consider for example the unique function f : Z610 → Z10 s.t. f(x1, . . . , x6) ≡ f ′ (x1 mod 2, . . . , x6 mod 2)
mod 2 and f(x1, . . . , x6) ≡ f ′′ (x1 mod 5, . . . , x6 mod 5) mod 5, where f ′ : Z62 → Z2 and f ′′ :
Z65 → Z5. By the Chinese Remainder Theorem instead of picking a secret mapping σ ∈ Zn10
we could equivalently pick the unique secret mappings σ1 ∈ Zn2 and σ2 ∈ Zn5 s.t σ ≡ σ1 mod 2
and σ ≡ σ2 mod 5. Now drawing challenge response pairs from the distributions Qfσ is equiv-
alent to drawing challenge-response pairs from the distributions Qf
′
σ1 and Q
f ′′
σ2 . Suppose that
f ′(x1, . . . , x6) = x1x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 + x6 mod 2, and f ′′(x1, . . . , x6) = x1. Then we have
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r(f) = min (r(f ′), r(f ′′)) = r(f ′′) = 1, but r(f ′) = 4. We can find σ2 using O
(
n log2 n
)
calls to
1-MSTAT(n), but to find σ we must also recover σ1. This provably requires at least Ω˜
(
nr(f
′)/2
)
=
Ω˜
(
n2
)
calls to 1-MSTAT
(
n2
)
.
Background The proof of Theorem 7 relies on the discrete spectral iteration algorithm of [26].
We begin by providing a brief overview of their algorithm. In their setting the secret mapping σ is
defined over the binary alphabet Zn2 . Let c1 = d r(f)2 e, c2 = b r(f)2 c and let δ ∈ [0, 2]\{1}. They use σ
to define a distribution over |Xc1 | × |Xc2 | matrices Mσ,δ,p = Mˆ (Qσ,δ,p)− Jp, where J denotes the
all ones matrix. For (C1) ∈ Xc1 , (C2) ∈ Xc2 such that C1
⋂
C2 = ∅ we have
Mˆ (Qσ,δ,p) [(C1) , (C2)] =

1, with probability (p (2− δ)) if ∑j∈C1∪C2 σ (j) ≡ 0 mod 2
1, with probability (pδ) if
∑
j∈C1∪C2 σ (j) 6≡ 0 mod 2
0, otherwise
.
Given a vector x ∈ {±1}|Xc2 | (resp. y ∈ {±1}|Xc1 |) Mσ,δ,px defines a distribution over vectors in
R|Xc1 | (resp. MTσ,py defines a distribution over vectors in R|Xc1 |).
If r(f) is even then the largest eigenvalue of E [Mσ,δ,p] has a corresponding eigenvector x∗ ∈
{±1}Xr(f)/2 , where for Ci ∈ Xr(f)/2 we have x∗ [Ci] = 1 if
∑
j∈Ci σ(j) ≡ 1 mod 2; otherwise
x∗ [Ci] = −1 (if r(f) is odd then we consider the top singular value instead). Feldman et al [26]
use discrete spectral iteration to find x∗ (or −x∗). Given x∗ it is easy to find σ using Gaussian
Elimination.
The discrete spectral iteration algorithm of Feldman et al [26] starts with a random vector x0 ∈
{0, 1}|Xc2 |. They then sample xi+1 ∼ Mσ,pxi and execute a normalization step to ensure that
xi+1 ∈ {0, 1}|Xk2 |. When r(f) is odd, power iteration has two steps: draw a sample yi ∼ Mσ,δ,pxi
and sample from the distribution xi+1 = MTσ,δ,py
i. They showed that O
(
log
∣∣Xr(f)∣∣) iterations
suffice to recover σ whenever p =
K log|Xr(f)|
(δ−1)2
√
|Xr(f)|
, and that for a vector x ∈ {0, 1}|Xk2 | (resp.
y ∈ {±1}|Xk1 |) it is possible to sample from Mσ,δ,px (resp. MTσ,δ,py) using O (1/p) queries to
1-MSTAT (|Xc1 |).
Our Reduction The proof of Theorem 7 uses a reduction to the algorithm of Feldman et al[26].
Proof of Theorem 7. (sketch) Given a mapping σ ∈ Znd and a number i ∈ Zd we define a mapping
σi ∈ Zn2 where
σi(j) =
{
1, if σ (j) = i
0, otherwise
.
Clearly, to recover σ it is sufficient to recover σi for each i ∈ Zd. Therefore, to prove Theorem 7 it
suffices to show that given x ∈ {±1}|Xk2 | (resp. y ∈ {±1}|Xk1 |) we can sample from the distribution
Mσi,δ,px (resp. M
T
σi,δ,p
y) using O (1/p) queries to 1-MSTAT
(∣∣Xdr(f)/2e∣∣) for each i ∈ {0, . . . , d−1},
where 1-MSTAT uses the distribution Qfσ. In general, this will not possible for arbitrary functions
f . However, Lemma 6 shows that for our candidate human computable functions f1,3, f2,2 we can
sample from the distributions Mσi,δ,px (resp. M
T
σi,δ,p
y). The proof of Lemma 6 is similar to the
proof of [26, Lemma 10]. 
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Lemma 6. Given vectors ~x ∈ {±1}|Xc1 |, ~y ∈ {±1}|Xc2 | we can sample from Mσi,δ,px and MTσ,δ,py
using O
(
n(k2+1)/2 log2 n
)
calls to the 1-MSTAT
(
ndr(f)/2e
)
oracle for f = fk1,k2.
The proof of Lemma 6 relies on Fact 3.
Fact 3. For each j, t ∈ Z10 we have
Pr
(x0,...,x9+k1+k2)∼Z
10+k1+k2
10
xt + 10+k1+k2∑
i=10+k1
xi ≡ j fk1,k2 (x0, . . . , x9+k1+k2) ≡ j mod 10
 = ( 910 ( 110)+ 110) ( 110)( 1
10
) = 19
100
,
and
Pr
(x0,...,x9+k1+k2)∼Z
10+k1+k2
10
xt + 10+k1+k2∑
i=10+k1
xi ≡ j fk1,k2 (σ (x0, . . . , x9+k1+k2)) 6≡ j mod 10
 = ( 910 ( 110)+ 110 (0)) ( 110)( 1
10
) = 9
100
.
Proof of Lemma 6. Given a value j ∈ Z10 and a value i ∈ Z10 we let xij ∈ {0, 1} be the indicator
variable for the event xj = i. By Fact 3 it follows that
Pr
(x0,...,xk1+k2+9)∼Z
k1+k2+10
10
[
xi0 + x
i
9+k1 + . . .+ x
i
7+k1+c1 ≡ 1 mod 2 fk1,k2 (σ (x0, . . . , x9+k1+k2)) ≡ ic1 mod 10
]
6= Pr
(x0,...,xk1+k2+9)∼Z
k1+k2+10
10
[
xi0 + x
i
9+k1 + . . .+ x
i
7+k1+c1 ≡ 1 mod 2 fk1,k2 (σ (x0, . . . , x9+k1+k2)) 6≡ ic1 mod 10
]
.
Now for fk1,k2 we define the function h
i,+ : Xk1+k2+10 × Z10 → Xc1 ∪ {⊥} as follows
hi,+ (x0, . . . , x9+k1+k2 , fk1,k2 (σ (x0, . . . , x9+k1+k2))) =
{
(x0, x9+k1 , . . . , x7+k1+c1) iffk1,k2 (σ (x0, . . . , x13)) ≡ ic1 mod 10
⊥ otherwise. .
Intuitively, given a clause C1 ∈ Xc1 the probability that hi,+ returns C1 is greater if
∑
j∈C1 σi(j) ≡ 1
mod 2.
Given a vector x ∈ {±1}|Xc1 | we query our 1-MSTAT (|Xc1 |+ 1) oracle d10/pe times with the
function hi,+ to sample from Mσi,δ,px. Let q1, . . . , qd10/pe ∈ Xc1 denote the responses and let x [qj ]
denote the value of the vector x at index qj . We observe that for some δ 6= 1 we have
Mσi,δ,px[C] ∼
∑
j∈d10/pe
qj 6=⊥
x [qj ]− p
∑
C′∈Xc1
x[C ′] ,
for every C ∈ Xc2 . 
Open Question Can we precisely characterize the functions f : Zkd → Zd for which we can
efficiently recover σ after seeing O˜
(
nr(f)/2
)
challenge-response pairs? Feldman et al. [26] gave
a statistical algorithm that recovers the secret mapping whenever d = 2 after making O˜
(
nr(f)/2
)
queries to 1-MSTAT
(
nr(f)/2
)
. While we show that the same algorithm can be used to recover σ after
making O˜
(
nr(f)/2
)
queries to 1-MSTAT
(
nr(f)/2
)
in our candidate human computable password
schemes with d = 10, we also showed that these results do not extend to all functions f : Zkd → Zd.
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G.2 Gaussian Elimination
Most known algorithmic techniques can be modeled within the statistical query framework. Gaus-
sian Elimination is a notable exception. As an example consider the function f(x1, . . . , x7) =
x1 + . . .+x7 mod 10 (in this example r(f) = 7 and g(f) = 0). Our previous results imply that any
statistical algorithm would need to see at least m = Ω˜
(
n7/2
)
challenge response pairs (C, f (σ (C)))
to recover σ. However, it is trivial to recover σ from O(n) random challenge response pairs using
Gaussian Elimination. In general, consider the following attacker shown in algorithm 4, which uses
Gaussian Elimination. Algorithm 4 relies on the subroutine TryExtract (C, f (σ (C)) , S, α), which
attempts to extract a linear constraint from (C, f (σ (C))) under the assumption that σ (S) = α.
We assume TryExtract (C, f (σ (C)) , S, α) returns ∅ if it cannot extract a linear constraint. For
example, if we assume that σ(1) = 4 and σ(2) = 8 and let C = (i0, i1, ..., i9, 1, 2, i10, i11) (with
ij ∈ [n]\{1, 2}) then we have f2,2 (σ (C)) = σ (i4+8 mod 10)+σ (i10)+σ (i11) mod 10. In this case,
TryExtract (C, f (σ (C)) , {1, 2}, {4, 8}) would return the constraint f (σ (C)) = σ (i2) + σ (i10) +
σ (i11) mod 10. However, TryExtract (C, f (σ (C)) , {i0, 2}, {4, 8}) would return ∅.
input: Clauses C1, . . . , Cm ∼ Xk, and labels f (σ (C1)) , . . . , f (σ (Cm)).
forall the S ∈ Xg(f), α ∈ Zg(f)d do
LC← ∅ ;
// LC is the set of linear constraints extracted
forall the C ∈ {C1, . . . , Cm} do
LC← LC⋃TryExtract (C, f (σ (C)) , S, α) ;
if |LC| ≥ n then
σ′ ← LinearSolve (LC) ;
if ∀i ∈ [m]. f (σ′ (Ci)) = f (σ (Ci)) ∈ C then
return σ′
end
end
end
end
Algorithm 4: GaussianAttack
Fact 4 says that an attacker needs at least m = Ω˜
(
n1+g(f)
)
challenge-response pairs to recover
σ using Gaussian Elimination. This is because the probability that TryExtract (C, f (σ (C))S, α)
extracts a linear constraint is at most O
(( |S|
n
)−g(f))
, which is O
(
n−g(f)
)
for |S| constant. The
adversary needs O(n) linearly independent constraints to run Gaussian Elimination. If the ad-
versary can see at most O˜
(
ns(f)
)
examples neither approach (Statistical Algorithms or Gaussian
Elimination) can be used to recover σ.
Fact 4. Algorithm 4 needs to see at least m = Ω˜
(
n1+g(f)
)
challenge-response pairs to recover σ.
Remark 4 explores the tradeoff between the adversary’s running time and the number of
challenge-response pairs that an adversary would need to see to recover σ using Gaussian elim-
ination. In particular the adversary can recover σ from O˜
(
n1+g(f)/2
)
challenge-response pairs if he
is willing to increase his running time by a factor of d
√
n. In practice, this attack may be reason-
able for n ≤ 100 and d = 10, which means that it may be beneficial to look for candidate human
computable functions f that maximize min{r(f)/2, 1 + g(f)/2} instead of s(f) whenever n ≤ 100.
45
Remark 4. If the adversary correctly guesses value of σ (S) for |S| = n then he may be able to
extract a linear constraint from a random example with probability Ω(1/n(1−)g(f)). The adversary
would only need O˜
(
n1+(1−)g(f)
)
examples to solve for σ, but his running time would be proportional
to dn — the expected number of guesses before he is correct.
H Rehearsal Model
In this section we review the usability model of Blocki et al. [13]. Their usability model estimates
the ‘extra effort’ that a user needs to expend to memorize and rehearse all of his secrets for a
password management scheme. In this section we use (cˆ, aˆ) to denote a cue-association pair, and
we use the variable t to denote time (days). In our context (cˆ, aˆ) might denote the association
between a letter (e.g., ‘e’) and the secret digit associated with that letter (e.g., σ (e)). If the user
does not rehearse an association (cˆ, aˆ) frequently enough then the user might forget it. Their are
two main components to their usability model: rehearsal requirements and visitation schedules.
Rehearsal requirements specify how frequently a cue-association pair must be used for a user to
remember the association. Visitation schedules specify how frequently the user authenticates to
each of his accounts and rehearses any cue-association pairs that are linked with the account.
H.1 Rehearsal Requirements
Blocki et al. [13] introduce a rehearsal schedule to ensure that the user remembers each cue-
association pair.
Definition 9. [13] A rehearsal schedule for a cue-association pair (cˆ, aˆ) is a sequence of times
tcˆ0 < t
cˆ
1 < .... For each i ≥ 0 we have a rehearsal requirement, the cue-association pair must be
rehearsed at least once during the time window
[
tcˆi , t
cˆ
i+1
)
= {x ∈ R tcˆi ≤ x < tcˆi+1}.
A rehearsal schedule is sufficient if a user can maintain the association (cˆ, aˆ) by following
the rehearsal schedule. The length of each interval
[
tcˆi , t
cˆ
i+1
)
may depend on the strength of the
mnemonic techniques used to memorize and rehearse a cue-association pair (cˆ, aˆ) as well as i —
the number of prior rehearsals [54, 52].
Expanding Rehearsal Assumption [13]: The rehearsal schedule given by tcˆi = 2
is is suffi-
cient to maintain the association (cˆ, aˆ), where s > 0 is a constant.
H.2 Visitation Schedules
Suppose that the user has m accounts A1, . . . , Am. A visitation schedule for an account Ai is a
sequence of real numbers τ i0 < τ
i
1 < . . ., which represent the times when the account Ai is visited
by the user. Blocki et al. [13] do not assume that the exact visitation schedules are known a priori.
Instead they model visitation schedules using a random process with a known parameter λi based
on E
[
τ ij+1 − τ ij
]
— the average time between consecutive visits to account Ai.
A rehearsal requirement
[
tcˆi , t
cˆ
i+1
)
can be satisfied naturally if the user visits a site Aj that uses
the cue cˆ (cˆ ∈ cj) during the given time window. Here, cj denote the set of cue-association pairs
that the user must remember when logging into account Aj . Formally,
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Schedule λ 11
1
3
1
7
1
31
1
365
Very Active 10 10 10 10 35
Typical 5 10 10 10 40
Occasional 2 10 20 20 23
Infrequent 0 2 5 10 58
Table 6: Visitation Schedules - number of accounts visited with frequency λ (visits/days)
Definition 10. [13] We say that a rehearsal requirement
[
tcˆi , t
cˆ
i+1
)
is naturally satisfied by a visi-
tation schedule τ i0 < τ
i
1 < . . . if ∃j ∈ [m], k ∈ N s.t cˆ ∈ cj and τ jk ∈
[
tcˆi , t
cˆ
i+1
)
. We use
ERt,cˆ =
∣∣∣{i tcˆi+1 ≤ t ∧ ∀j, k.(cˆ /∈ cj ∨ τ jk /∈ [tcˆi , tcˆi+1))}∣∣∣ ,
to denote the number of rehearsal requirements that are not naturally satisfied by the visitation
schedule during the time interval [0, t].
Example: Consider the human computable function f2,2 from section 3, and suppose that the
user has to compute f2,2 (σ (Ci)) to authenticate at account Aj , where Ci = (x0, . . . , x13). When
the user computes f2,2 he must rehearse the associations (x10, σ (x10)), (x11, σ (x11)), (x12, σ (x12)),
(x13, σ (x13)) and (xi, σ (xi)) where i = (σ (x10) + σ (x11) mod 10). Thus cj ⊃ {xi, x10, x11, x12, x13}.
When user authenticates he naturally rehearses each of these associations in cj .
If a cue-association pair (cˆ, aˆ) is not rehearsed naturally during the interval
[
tcˆi , t
cˆ
i+1
)
then the
user needs to perform an extra rehearsal to maintain the association. Intuitively, ERt,cˆ denotes the
total number of extra rehearsals of the cue-association pair (cˆ, aˆ) during the time interval [0, t], and
ERt =
∑
cˆ∈C ERt,cˆ denotes the total number of extra rehearsals during the time interval [0, t] to
maintain all of the cue-association pairs. Thus, a smaller value of E [ERt] indicates that the user
needs to do less extra work to rehearse his secret mapping.
Poisson Arrival Process The visitation schedule for each account Aj is given by a Poisson
arrival process with parameter λj , where 1/λj = E
[
τ ij+1 − τ ij
]
denotes the average time between
consecutive visits to account Aj .
Evaluating Usability Blocki et al. [13] prove the following theorem. Given a sufficient rehearsal
schedule and a visitation schedule, Theorem 8 predicts the value of ERt, the total number of extra
rehearsals that a user will need to do to remember all of the cue-association pairs required to
reconstruct all of his passwords.
Theorem 8. [13] Let icˆ∗ =
(
arg maxx t
cˆ
x < t
)− 1 then
E [ERt] =
∑
cˆ∈C
icˆ∗∑
i=0
exp
−
∑
j s.t.
cˆ∈cj
λj
(tcˆi+1 − tcˆi)

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We use the formula from Theorem 8 to obtain the usability results in Table 7. To evaluate this
formula we need to be given the rehearsal requirements, a visitation schedule (λi) for each account
Ai and a set of public challenges ~Ci ∈ (X14)10 for each account Ai. The rehearsal requirements are
given by the Expanding Rehearsal Assumption [13] (we use the same association strength parameter
s = 1 as Blocki et al. [13]), and the visitation schedules for each user are given in Table 6. We
assume that each password is 10 digits long and that the challenges ~Ci ∈ (X14)10 are chosen at
random by Algorithm 2. Notice that each time the user responds to a single digit challenge he
rehearses the secret mapping at five locations (see discussion in Section 3.1). Because the value
of E [ER365] depends on the particular password challenges that we generated for each account,
we ran Algorithm 2 and computed the resulting value E [ER365] one-hundred times. The values in
Table 7 represent the mean value of E [ER365] across all hundred instances.
I Sum of k-Mins
In the basic Hopper-Blum [34] Human Identification Protocol the user memorizes a subset S ⊆ [n]
of k = |S| secret indices. A single digit challenge consisted of a vector x ∈ Zn10 of n digits and the
user responded by with the mod 10 sum of the digits at k ≤ n secret locations plus an error term
e ∑
i∈S
xi mod 10 + e .
Typically, the user will set e = 0, but occasionally the user is supposed to respond with a completely
random digit instead of the correct response (e.g., so that the adversary cannot simply use Gaussian
Elimination to find S). Thus, the human user must occasionally generate random numbers in his
head to execute the Hopper-Blum protocol. This is potentially problematic because humans are
not good at consciously generating random numbers [53, 27, 42]. In fact, hard learning problems
like noisy parity might even be easy to learn when humans are providing the source of noise.
Hopper and Blum [34] also proposed a deterministic human identification protocol call sum of
k-mins. In this protocol the user memorized k secret pairs (i, j) of indices S ⊆ [n]2. As before a
single digit challenge consists of a vector x ∈ Zn10 of n digits. However, now the response to the
challenge is deterministic ∑
(i,j)∈S
min{xixj} mod 10 .
We observe that for any constant k the protocol is not secure against polynomial time attackers who
have seen O
(
k · log n) examples. The adversary can simply enumerate all possible sets S of k pairs
and cross out the ones that are inconsistent with the challenge-response pairs he has already seen.
Even for larger k (e.g., greater human work) Hopper and Blum [34] observed that the protocol
was not secure against an adversary who has seen O(n2) examples. To see this observe that we
can create an indicator variable yi,j for each pair (i, j). Each challenge response pair (x, r) yields
a linear constraint ∑
(i,j)
yi,j min{xi, xj} = r mod 10 .
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Our Scheme (σ ∈ Zn10) Shared Cues
User n = 100 n = 50 n = 30 SC-0 SC-1 SC-2
Very Active 0.396 0.001 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 3.93 7.54
Typical 2.14 0.039 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 10.89 19.89
Occasional 2.50 0.053 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 22.07 34.23
Infrequent 70.7 22.3 6.1 ≈ 2.44 119.77 173.92
Table 7: E [ER365]: Extra Rehearsals over the first year to re-
member σ : {1, . . . , n} → Z10 in our scheme with f2,2 or f1,3.
Compared with Shared Cues schemes SC-0,SC-1 and SC-2[13].
A B C D
0 E 5 J
1 F 6 K
2 G 7 L
3 H 8 M
4 I 9 N
Table 8: Single-Digit
Challenge Layout.
Given a random map-
ping σ from letters
to digits the user can
compute f2,2 (σ (‘C
′))
by executing the fol-
lowing steps (1) Recall
σ(‘A′) — the number
associated with the
letter A, (2) Recall
σ(‘B′), (3) Compute
i = σ(‘A′) + σ(‘B′)
mod 10 — without
loss of generality
suppose that i = 8,
(4) Find the letter
at index i—‘M’ if
i = 8, (5) Recall
σ(‘M ′) (6) Recall
σ(‘C ′) (7) Compute
j = σ(‘M ′) + σ(‘C ′)
mod 10 (8) Recall
σ(‘D′) (9) Return
j + σ(‘D′) mod 10.
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